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ABSTRACT

DEFINING AND MEETING THE DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL
MACHINERY IN CHINA: A CASE STUDY OF JOHN DEERE
by
Garrett W. Davis, Master of Business Administration
Utah State University, 2009
Major Professor: Dr. DeeVon Bailey
Department: Applied Economics
There has been little research conducted regarding the agricultural
machinery market in China. However, current data suggest that this demand
is dramatically increasing. This dissertation endeavors to generally define the
current demand of the agricultural machinery market in China. There has
been research conducted on multiple factors of the agricultural machinery
market in China, such as land tenure rights, rural migration, government
agricultural policies, and others. Through the use of limited quantitative data,
market demand is analyzed and defined. By means of a qualitative case
study of a successful multi-national corporation, Deere & Co., how the
demand is being met for agricultural machinery in China is also discussed.
This case study also contributes to defining market demand for agricultural
machinery in China. Through the use of this mixed-method research, key
components of the Chinese agricultural machinery market are identified and
analyzed. Challenges within this market are discussed, along with how Deere
& Co.’s Chinese operations have dealt with these challenges. This
corporation’s experience in the Chinese market brings benefit to any
company seeking to better understand the workings of the agricultural
machinery market in China.
(163 pages)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
China’s economy has been growing rapidly during the past two
decades and, as a result, China is now receiving more international attention
than ever before. As a result of this rapid economic growth, China is facing a
surge in demand for food products at a time when labor is being bid away
from rural areas into urban centers. With current high grain prices and stress
on agriculture worldwide, China is now subsidizing rather than taxing
agriculture as one method for attempting to increase agricultural production.
The need to increase agricultural production will have profound and lasting
impacts on the sectors providing inputs to Chinese agriculture. One of these
key sectors is the agricultural machinery industry.
Currently, there is minimal machinery usage in rural China, but with the
movement of labor into more industrialized urban areas, there is an emerging
need to replace that labor through farm mechanization. China also wants to
increase its production efficiency in agriculture. Mechanization will play a key
role in accomplishing this goal. How China will implement more capital inputs,
such as farm machinery, into agricultural production is a question not yet fully
answered.
Defining what current and future demands are for agricultural
machinery is a challenge given the limited secondary data available on the
machinery market in China. Proposing ways for industry to meet the
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increasing demand for agricultural machinery in China is another challenge.
There should be opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI) to help
China achieve its goal of increased mechanization in agriculture. U.S.
industry players such as John Deere, Case, and Caterpillar could potentially
benefit through participation in this emerging market, along with other
investors from the United States and other countries. The Chinese agricultural
economy can also be a large beneficiary, together with Chinese consumers,
as agricultural productivity in China increases. The purpose of this
dissertation is to identify and analyze the demand for agricultural machinery in
China and to identify potential ways and methods to meet that demand.

1.2 Research Question
What is the demand in China for agricultural machinery, and how could
agribusiness firms potentially meet that demand?

1.3 Aims and Objectives
This research inquires into the current demand in China for agricultural
machinery to better understand ways in which agribusiness firms may meet
that demand. Once the state of agricultural machinery demand is identified, it
can be analyzed and used to better understand historical trends and how
future demand for mechanization in Chinese agriculture may evolve. This
type of information can also be used to help establish effective ways
businesses can respond to this demand.

2

The demand analysis presented in this research will have a
quantitative focus; however, the majority of the research will have a
qualitative orientation. The reason for this is the lack of publicly available
information about agricultural machinery markets in China. Consequently,
much of the analysis must rely on expert opinion, including a case study as
well as the limited amount of secondary data that are available. Therefore, a
case study of John Deere, Inc.’s (John Deere) China operations will be
performed to obtain expert opinion, experience, and information that will
contribute to the major qualitative portion of this research.
The main tasks to be accomplished to achieve the objectives of this
inquiry and analysis are as follows:
•

Review the recent literature regarding issues relating to Chinese
agricultural machinery demand.

•

Identify and assess Chinese agricultural policy and its impact on
agricultural machinery markets.

•

Determine the economic and policy factors affecting Chinese
farmers’ purchasing decisions and machinery use.

•

Obtain and analyze Chinese national statistical data regarding
historical agricultural machinery trends.

•

Assess and analyze this information to determine the potential and
current agricultural machinery demand.

•

Conduct a case study of John Deere operations in China, including
interviews with key players in the business.
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•

Analyze John Deere’s business strategy, and identify key elements
used in meeting agricultural machinery demand in China.

•

Edit, critique, and improve the final analysis, results, and
implications in answering the inquiry.

1.4 Topic Justification
This research strives to answer many questions that previously have
not been fully addressed, at least in the public literature. It will draw upon
data that can provide added insight into the state of Chinese agriculture and
how the market for agricultural equipment in China is emerging in the
dynamic economic environment that exists in China. As the Chinese
economy continues to grow, additional infrastructure and investment in capital
will be needed in all industries. This would be expected in any developing
economy growing as fast as China’s. What is less clear is how an
agribusiness should position itself to participate in this rapid growth given the
complex nature of policy, politics, and economics in China.
As the Chinese people improve their living standards, their diet will
demand increasing levels of protein. In turn, this will increase the need for
more efficient agriculture to meet the needs of consumers without greatly
increased food prices. In addition to diet and living standard improvements,
the increasing demand for alternative energy through biofuels is increasing
demand for grain to be used in producing biofuels. This results in higher
world grain prices than would have existed without the increasing demand for
biofuels but also provides greater opportunity for Chinese farmers to meet the
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local and international demands for grain, especially if they are able to
improve yields. In order to improve yields, economics suggests that either
more labor or more mechanization is required.
Currently, there are increasing opportunities for Chinese labor to move
to cities from rural areas to take jobs in manufacturing industries because of
the higher wages found there compared to agricultural jobs. As the rural
labor force in China moves out of the country and into the urban population, a
labor shortage is being created in rural areas that will likely be compensated
for through increased mechanization of farming practices. Because of the
labor methods used historically in Chinese farming, there are inadequate
amounts of machinery available, and the demand for agricultural machinery is
increasing.
Another question is how the demand for agricultural machinery can be
effectively met in the current political, social, and economical environments in
China. Meeting this demand could provide potential opportunities for
agribusiness that will help international markets and the Chinese economy. It
will especially be beneficial to the Chinese agriculture industry and, thus, a
large portion of the Chinese population, because China is still primarily a rural
country.
The exploration and analysis of these inquiries will bring a change to
the current understanding of businesses and academics. Others who wish to
conduct further studies on particular topics of this dissertation may also find
this exploration to be of assistance to their efforts. Chinese agricultural
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machinery and its business implications are something that is already seeing
an enormous change. These inquiries may clarify and answer much of the
speculation which is present.

1.5 Ethical Considerations
One main ethical consideration is regarding the businesses that have
contributed information to this study. Because these businesses have
willingly shared what could be considered sensitive and proprietary
information, these details must be carefully handled to protect the sources.
All information provided by John Deere will be kept confidential. Only after
John Deere has reviewed and approved the information used in the results
will the approved information be made available as public information.

1.6 Scope and Limitations
The scope of this project includes focusing on China as a nation. Even
though a particular province approach may give more tailored solutions, by
using all of China gives a more comprehensive picture of what is needed in
terms of defining and meeting the nation’s agricultural machinery demand.
Another reason for this approach is the availability and accuracy of data
which are lacking at the provincial level but are present at the national level.
However, some provincial information is used in assessing geographical
portions of business strategy recommendations.
Because of the vast diversity that the word machinery evokes, tractors
are used as the main focus, or proxy, to represent the majority of agricultural
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machinery. Most agricultural machinery is tailored with the tractor being the
main piece of capital and smaller implements being complimentary to it.
Access to detailed Chinese government information has been a
limitation to this project as there is a limited amount of relevant information
that is public information. There is adequate information, but some useful
details are not available that would otherwise give more insights into these
issues. Included in this limitation is what is lost in translation of particular
Chinese documents. Some information is only available in Chinese and
therefore limits the amount that can be translated and used in the timeframe
of this project.
The reliability of Chinese statistical data is also a limitation to this
project. Chinese statistical recording methods have evolved over time and
have seemed to increase in technique accuracy and consistency within the
past few decades. However, Chinese data reliability is something that is
difficult to measure and, where possible, multiple sources of statistical data
have been used to help increase the validity of this study (see Gale 2002).
As this dissertation is being completed mostly in the United States,
another limitation is the time and resources available to personally conduct
any large surveys or extensive on-site inspections of Chinese agriculture
operations. However, a brief observational visit to China is part of the
qualitative case study analysis. This limitation has been overcome through
the use of historical data, expert experience and opinion, and qualitative
assessment of the case study company.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
The topic of the demand for agricultural machinery in China is one that
has not previously been researched or analyzed by many scholars. This is
due to the extensive lack of data available for study. Chinese officials have
only recently begun to open up more information to the public. There is
related research on topics such as agricultural inputs, commodities, and
policy. These related topics lay the foundation for the discussion of Chinese
demand for agricultural machinery presented in this dissertation. This
dissertation relies heavily on economic and business theory and a case study
to explain the features of the emerging market for agricultural machinery in
China. This chapter presents the relevant literature that provides the
appropriate setting for this study.

2.2 Agricultural Machinery in China
There have been a few research studies performed regarding how
technology has affected agricultural production in China (see Fan 1991;
Huang and Rozelle 1994; Jin et al. 2002; Van den Berg et al. 2007). Jin et
al.’s (2002) research focused mainly on new crop variety technologies and
agricultural extension work in China. They illustrate with survey data and
econometrics that technology is a key factor in increasing total factor
productivity (TFP).
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Fan (1991) strives to define and determine differences in inputs,
institutional reform, and technological changes on production growth in
China’s agriculture. He concludes that all three contribute to production
growth but technological inputs (especially modern technology such as
machinery and chemical fertilizer) account for 57.7% of production growth
between 1965 and 1985. Machinery alone accounted for 18.8% of production
growth.
Huang and Rozelle (1994) also support the importance of technology
in increasing production, and they show that contrary to previous research
such as Lin (1992), it has had an even greater effect than the implementation
of the household responsibility system (HRS).1 This study mentions little
regarding technological inputs such as agricultural machinery. However, it
supports the relevance and importance of technology in increasing
agricultural production in China.
Van den Berg et al. (2007) use a county in China’s Zhejiang province
as a case study in determining impacts of increasing farm size and
mechanization on rice production and rural income. They concluded that as
farm size increases, rice production with increased mechanization becomes
the best way to concurrently increase grain production and rural incomes.
Increasing grain production and rural incomes are two emphasized
agricultural policies in China. With very small farm sizes, these policies seem
to contradict each other as farmers have more incentive to grow high value,

1

The HRS is the government system for Chinese agriculture that left local villages and townships in
control of land allocation to each family.
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labor-intensive specialty crops than to grow more grain. Most specialty crops
are also challenging to mechanize and thus more challenging to increase
production yields through the use of manual labor.
However, these studies have chosen not to address the demand for
agricultural technology in China. The reason for this is likely because open
markets are just emerging within the country and because publicly available
data are limited and scarce. This dissertation focuses on one area of
agricultural technology─agricultural machinery. The reasoning for this
includes empirical evidence suggesting that large investments in farm
machinery are taking place in China. There are several reasons for this and
each will be discussed. However, there seems to be very little prior research
that defines Chinese demand of agricultural machinery. Therefore, in order to
fully understand this phenomenon, we must understand the elements of
agricultural machinery demand and the economic setting that exists in China.

2.3 Average Chinese Farm/Farmer Situation
One determinant of agricultural machinery is farm size. Economies of
scale infer that machinery will only be used if there is a large enough farm
area to spread its cost over the asset’s useful life. According to the 2006
Chinese Agricultural Yearbook, the average Chinese farm is 2.08 mu2 per
farmer, which is equivalent to 0.34 acres. This is very small in terms of farm
size worldwide (see Table 2.1).

2

A mu is the Chinese unit of land measurement. 15 mu=1 hectare or 6.07mu=1 acre.
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Table 2.1. Comparison of Average Land per Farmer in Selected Countries

Source: Gale, Somwaru, and Diao 2002 : 44.

This small farm size is due to the dissolution of the collective system
that took place in 1978-84 when the (HRS) was implemented. The HRS
placed local townships and villages in charge of land allocation to farmers and
rural residents (Lohmar, Somwaru, and Wiebe 2002).
Land tenure rights affect farmers’ capital purchasing decisions. As
farmers perceive less risk of their tenure assignments changing (or in other
words, increased stability), they are more willing to invest in capital goods
(see Feder et al. 1992). Because of how the HRS is structured, all land is still
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owned by the “collective” village or township but is utilized by the farmers.
Farmers have the right to grow crops and implement farm practices basically
unrestricted and, after taxes, may keep or sell any excess. In rare exceptions,
particular crop assignments are made by local officials. These land tenure
rights were first established for a 15-year contract period and later extended
to a 30-year period. After the expiration of this contract period, it may be
renewed or possibly reallocated by local officials. More recently in 2002, the
Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) was passed that spelled out in more
detail how this 30-year land rights tenure was to be protected from political,
frequent reallocations by local governments. It also strives to ensure fair
compensation to farmers when reallocation does occur. However, there
seem to be points of ambiguity in the literature as to what extent this is
enforced on a national scale (see RDI 2007; Li 2003). Therefore, further
clarification still needs to be accomplished through government legislation.
(For a summary of land tenure development in China, see Appendix A.)
Average farmer income is an essential part of agricultural machinery
demand. As farmers’ income increases, their ability to purchase and invest in
capital also increases. The average Chinese farmer’s income has steadily
increased over time and consists not only of on-farm income but rural
household businesses and off-farm remittances. In 2008, annual farmer net
income was expected to reach 4,000 yuan ($540), while it was only 2,253.42
yuan ($272.53) at the end of 2000 (China Daily 2007a; National Bureau of
Statistics of China 2006). In early 2009, China reported that farmer’s per
3

Calculated from International Monetary Fund Archive Dec. 2000 Exchange Rate of 8.27 yuan = $1.
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capita income actually increased to 4,761 yuan ($697) during 2008, which
was higher than estimated. It was also reported that this was the sixth
consecutive year of an increase greater than 6% (China Daily 2009). This
more than doubling of farmers’ income nationwide makes the possibility of
agricultural machinery purchases even more feasible for many more Chinese
farmers. Also during the 2008 17th communist party congress, the goal was
set of doubling again Chinese farmers’ income by 2020 (China Daily 2008b).
This is another indication of further increasing Chinese farmers’ capabilities of
investing in agricultural machinery in the future.

2.4 Chinese Agricultural Policies
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has seemed to continue its trend
of privatizing more of its state-controlled industries to reap the benefits of a
market economy for its people. It has given more control over key industries
to the private business sector while maintaining a portion of the previous
state-owned enterprises (SOE) (Shane and Gale 2004). This is seen in
agricultural machinery, dairy, and other industries throughout China. Not only
does this trend give rise to more efficient markets, it also allows for and
encourages FDI in these industries.
China has taxed agriculture for many generations as it has previously
been the most wide-spread occupation and the largest tax revenue generator.
However, in 2004 for the first time, China implemented agricultural subsidies
in light of the more industrialized economy where agriculture now contributes
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roughly only 15% of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Gale,
Lohmar, and Tuan 2005).
Another main reason for the Chinese government to implement these
changes in their agricultural policies is due to the increasing income gap
between rural and urban residents (China Daily 2007b; Shane and Gale 2004;
Gale and Park 2002). These new policies support one of the government’s
main goals of raising rural incomes to help narrow this gap (China Daily
2007a). In October 2008, China also stated a goal of doubling farmer
incomes from the 2008 average by the year 2020 (China Daily 2008b). As
these goals continue to be supported by Chinese officials, it will give farmers
greater purchasing power to invest in yield-improving technologies, including
agricultural machinery.
The recent changes in China’s agricultural policies include tax
elimination and subsidies for grain production, high quality seed varieties, and
agricultural machinery, as well as increased investment in rural and
agricultural infrastructure (i.e., roads, power plants, irrigation, research parks).
These policy changes are aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and to
support farmers in implementing more efficient farm practices and agricultural
inputs. A summary of these new policies is in Table 2.2. Grain subsidies
included rice (various types), wheat, corn, and rapeseed. These subsidies
varied by region and province and were funded mostly through national
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Table 2.2. Summary of New Chinese Agricultural Policies

Source: Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 2005 : 3.

revenues, but some provincial funding was added. After high media exposure,
subsidies were given directly to farmers mainly based on planted area. Even
though grain subsidies were implemented, they account for “less than 2
percent of the gross value of grain production” (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan
2005 : 5), thus giving little added incentive to plant grain. “Inducing farmers to
plant more grain conflicts with the goal of increasing rural income because
grain earns little income, compared with cotton, vegetables, fruit orchards,
and other specialty crops”(Gale, Lohmar, & Tuan 2005 : 14). However, the
trend regarding subsidy implementation infers the Chinese government’s
increased desire to support and sustain agriculture, ensure food security, and
encourage more productive farming methods. Therefore, they are likely to
increase these subsidies in the future to see that their policy goals are met.
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Subsidies for agricultural machinery obviously will contribute to
increased demand for these products. This new policy, available to farmers
in 16 provinces in 2004, makes agricultural machinery available at the
subsidized price which can compensate up to 30% of the original price.
Dealers will collect subsidies from provincial governments (Gale, Lohmar, and
Tuan 2005). In this way, additional assurance is given that farmers will
receive the subsidized price of agricultural machinery and that subsidy
investments are being used for what they are intended.
Eventual agricultural tax elimination has taken place faster than
planned. During 2005, 25 of 31 provinces/regions in China had no
agricultural tax. This policy change, along with subsidy implementation,
currently has had only marginal effects on overall average farmer incomes
(see Figure 2.1) (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 2005).
However, it is an important change in direction for Chinese agricultural
policy. The importance of agriculture to the Chinese people is increasing, and
this new policy will continue to accelerate increases in farmer incomes and
their incentives for investment in agricultural inputs including agricultural
machinery.
Agricultural policies have focused on rural economic improvement and
increasing farmer incomes. Another goal of these policies is national food
security. There have been a number of studies done that debate the topic of
China’s food consumption and their ability to feed the nation.
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Figure 2.1. Chinese Rural Income Growth Factors
Source: Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan 2005 : 9.

The range of predictions about China's food economy in the 21st
century vary even more greatly. Some Chinese economists have forecast that
China will be a major exporter (Chen and Buckwell 1991; Mei, 1995). Other
analysts project that China's imports will soar in the near future, and that
China will become the largest importer in the world (Garnaut and Ma 1992;
Carter and Zhong 199l). Brown (1995) takes the most extreme position,
claiming that China's grain production will fall in absolute terms while demand
will rise, creating a shortfall of more than 200 million metric tons by 2030
(cited by Rozelle and Rosegrant 1997 : 192).

17

China has deemed food security a priority and it is evident through
their new agricultural polices that essential crop self-sufficiency is a goal they
are moving towards. One food security goal is to ensure adequate land is
preserved for food production use. China has set an arable land minimum
level of 120 million hectares (296.5 million acres). China currently has grain
production output goals that will help them accomplish their estimated food
security needs. In 2006, grain production was 500 million tons. China wants
to reach and maintain an annual grain output level of 551 million tons until
2010, then to reach 595 million tons by 2020 (China Daily 2008a). As
agricultural productivity becomes a priority, improving agricultural inputs and
their availability to farmers becomes a main focus.
Something that has caused Chinese officials to adjust how some
policies are formed and implemented is the accession of China to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). In Dec 2001, China acceded to the WTO after
years of striving to do so. Becoming a WTO member is aimed at reducing
trade-distorting practices and increasing free market competition in the global
marketplace. As China’s policies transition to be compliant with WTO
standards, agriculture is one sector that will be greatly affected (Crook 2002).
For a summary of China’s WTO agricultural commitments made as part of
joining the WTO, see Appendix B.

2.5 Global and National Trends Affecting
Chinese Agriculture
With economies of nations becoming more globally connected in their
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markets, policies, and relations, many world economy factors affect China’s
agriculture and, therefore, the nation’s demand for agricultural machinery.
Trends and issues within China also can greatly influence agricultural
machinery demands as they increase or decrease the need for agricultural
products or the cost of production.
Chinese consumers are demanding protein-rich diets more than ever
before. The work that has previously been accomplished in defining change
in diet demands is well documented (Hsu, Chern, and Gale 2002; Pingali
2006). As the demand for protein-rich foods such as beef, poultry, and pork
increases, the demand for grains to be used in livestock feed also increases.
While it is true that grains for consumer consumption will decrease as protein
increases, the efficiency at which livestock convert grain feeds is much less
than grain itself (Fuller, Tuan, and Wailes 2002). As current Chinese policies
stand, this increasing grain requirement will continue to drive increased
efficiency in agricultural production to meet that demand.
Pingali (2006) shows that there is an increasing trend of Asian diets
becoming more westernized with increased protein, temperate fruits, wheat,
and wheat-based product consumption. The movement of the Chinese labor
force into more urbanized areas also has an effect on their diet trends (Huang
and David 1993). All of these changes in Asian diets will have a great effect
on grain consumption by animals and humans. This, in turn, will have a large
impact on the need and priority of improving agriculture in China.
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The Chinese population is not only increasing its protein consumption
but also its dairy consumption (Chen 2003). In 2000, 8,274,000 tons of milk
were produced, and in 2005, 31,934,000 tons of milk were produced showing
milk production almost quadrupling in six years (National Bureau of Statistics
of China 2007b). Milk production, especially high-yielding production
practices, also requires grains as inputs and therefore will continue to
increase China’s demand for grains.
Wheat prices have risen to record highs within the last five years and
have given added profits to farmers worldwide. Multiple global factors have
contributed to these prices. Droughts in Australia have greatly diminished
their supply to offer to world markets and as supply decreases for a product in
demand, the price of that product increases (BBC News 2008). Ethanol
production, which was mandated in the Unites States in 2005, has consumed
a large portion of excess grain produced for world markets and is continuing
to contribute to higher grain prices (Kirchhoff 2008a). Recent flooding in the
midwestern United States also has contributed to increased grain prices
(Kirchhoff 2008b). Even though year-to-year events vary and fluctuations in
grain prices are no guarantee, growing trends are highlighting the importance
of food security for China and will give further incentives to farmers and the
government to efficiently increase production.
Rising oil prices are affecting many industries throughout the world.
Chinese agriculture is also being affected. Transportation costs as well as
production costs increase as the price of fuel increases. This will decrease
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the incentives for using and purchasing farm machinery. Chinese officials are
working to increase their oil supply through foreign oil investments (CNN
2008b; Karadsheh 2008). Also, China currently heavily subsidizes their oil
prices to allow their economy to continue to grow. Again, the continuation of
high oil prices in the short run is hard to predict. However, because of lengthy
periods of high-priced oil, most governments are now increasing efforts in
planning for more long term sustainability. As the cost of oil subsidy to the
government continues to rise, Chinese government policies will have to adjust.
These adjustments will affect how they continue to subsidize agricultural
mechanization. Fuel efficiency is a part of this. China will probably be more
likely to support and encourage subsidization of more fuel-efficient models,
which will affect what the agricultural machinery industry will do to meet this
potential demand.

2.6 Shift of Labor to Urban Areas
China’s population has many dynamic aspects that influence various
social and economic factors of agricultural machinery demand. As the
quantity of an input (labor) decreases, the price or demand of that input
increases. With the rapid economic growth that China has experienced in the
past few decades, more opportunities are available to its population to work in
manufacturing, service, and other industries besides agriculture. The larger
portion of FDI has been in urban areas, where more infrastructure, skilled
labor force, and developing markets are found (Weersink and Rozelle 1997;
Rozelle, Pray, and Huang 1999). The majority of these employment
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opportunities are located in urban areas and offer wages much higher than
rural employment. Therefore, China has seen an increase in migration of
labor from rural areas into urban centers (see Figure 2.2).
This has been a large factor toward increased rural labor wages as
labor has become less available for full-time farming. Farmers can more
readily justify capital purchases to replace the more expensive and migrant
work force. These new economic opportunities and this labor migration
cause many changes to rural and urban areas, which affect demand for
agricultural machinery.
One change in rural areas is the increased incentive for those farmers
who desire to seek urban employment to rent their allocated land rights to
farmers who wish to increase their production and take advantage of
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Figure 2.2. Change in China Population Composition.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007.
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economies of scale. As this occurs, investing in agricultural machinery
becomes more economical as the cost of capital is spread over larger land
areas. As farms become larger, labor-intensive crops become less practical
and mechanization is not only more affordable but much more productive
(Van den Berg et al. 2007). According to Zhang, Ma, and Xu (2004 : 1071):
The Labour-transfer process here is initiated and regulated by
the demand for labour in the off-farm sector. This demand-regulated
labour transfer creates the subsequent supply-driven dynamics in land
rental markets: when the demand in off-farm labour markets increases,
more labourers leave agriculture and relinquish their land rights,
creating the supply that spurs land rental transactions.
As urban employment opportunities and wages increase, more farmers are
willing to take the opportunity costs of renting their allocated land rights to
farmers who want to grow their rural operations and income. As farm size
increases, so does farmer income and again an increased potential to invest
in farm capital (Rozelle, Huang, and Zhang 2002).
Another change affecting urban and rural areas is the transfer of
cultivated land to industrial uses. Even though there is legislation that
restricts agricultural land conversion, it is still taking place with village and
township approval. As urban investments have increased, farm land has
been converted to urban industry or residential areas for the increased labor
force. Deng et al. (2006) have researched the effects of this conversion on
agricultural production from 1986 to 2000 and conclude that it has had very
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little effect on overall food production levels. They also mention that
cultivated land areas actually have increased during this time period due to
conversion of other land types. Therefore, this trend has not hindered the
increase in farm size and appears to not be a barrier to increasing economical
farm mechanization.
The urban and rural labor forces have also been affected by China’s
one-child policy. This policy was implemented in the late 1970s as China’s
method of population control. It gives exceptions to minority groups and
allows rural residents to have two children, and some variability exists
between provinces. Those who have more children are given heavy fines,
and, thus, the Chinese government uses financial and other incentives to
encourage this policy (Kane and Choi 1999). China has announced that this
policy will continue for the next ten years (CNN 2008a). This will continue to
limit the growth of the rural and urban labor forces to some extent (see
Figure 2.3). Therefore, agricultural mechanization will more likely be used to
meet the rural labor demand, especially as higher urban incomes and
increased urban employment opportunities continue to draw down rural labor
supply.
One limiting factor to rural-urban migration is the household
registration system, also known as the hukou (戶口) system. This has had
various effects on migration and has not fully deterred rural residents from
working in higher paying urban employment as they live in city slums, even
though their official hukou status is rural (Chan and Buckingham 2008).

24

Birth, Death, and Natural Growth Rate of China
25.00
20.00
Birth Rate

%

15.00

Death Rate
10.00

Natural Growth Rate

5.00

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1978

0.00

Year

Figure 2.3. Changes in China Population Rates.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007.

2.7 Agricultural Credit Availability
As credit opportunities are more readily available, capital investments
tend to occur at an increased rate. Rural credit channels and availability have
developed in many ways over the past few decades and have just recently
undergone large reform measures. Since the late 1970s, the majority of
agricultural loans were obtained from the state-owned Agricultural Bank of
China (ABC). But, in 2001, a political push to increase rural credit to small
farmers caused a reform of China’s Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs).
These institutions now provide more than 80% of China’s official agricultural
credit. Because of these recent reforms, along with changes in agricultural
policy initiatives regarding rural credit, lending to farmers has more than
doubled between 2001 and 2005. (Gale and Collender 2006) (see Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4. Changes in China’s Agricultural Lending.
Source: Gale and Collender 2006.

Many local RCCs have been merged to now operate on the county and
provincial levels. They previously were reluctant to lend to the agricultural
community as they have had high default rates (40-50%) and their credit
worthiness has been difficult to validate. Interest rates were also capped by
government policy, preventing high-risk related rates to be charged. However,
as reforms have gone forward, these limitations have been compensated for
through national support. Therefore, these institutions are still largely policy
driven and are slowly developing market characteristics (Gale and Collender
2006).
RCCs are not the only source of credit to farmers. There are also
sources of informal credit as farmers cooperate with family and friends to
receive needed capital. Other national banks provide credit for small loans
and rural infrastructure investments (Gale and Collender 2006). See

26

Appendix C for a summarized list of current rural credit sources. These
recent credit increases allow further investment in agricultural fixed assets
and capital inputs.

2.8 Conclusion
There are many factors that affect the demand for agricultural
machinery in China. Only the main factors have been discussed in this
section. This gives a broad understanding of the key components of
agricultural machinery demand in the Chinese market. By presenting issues
that the average Chinese farmer is facing, better analyses and research of
agricultural machinery demand in China can be performed. These issues
also support that Chinese demand for agricultural machinery is increasing.
This research will build upon these issues to determine what is occurring in
the Chinese agricultural machinery market and how businesses are meeting
this demand.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
There are a number of possible research methods that could be used
to address the research question in this dissertation. This chapter will clarify
and define the different possible methodological approaches and methods
that could be used to identify agricultural machinery demand in China and
how businesses can meet that demand. An explanation of which approach
was actually taken to answer this question will also be given. The setup and
application of a case study method are described.

3.2 Research Question and Aims and Objectives
The specific research question to be addressed by the research
described in this dissertation is the following: “What is the demand for
agricultural machinery in China, and how could agribusiness firms potentially
meet that demand?”
The specific objectives of the research pursued for this dissertation
(also indicated in Chapter 1) are the following:
•

Review the recent literature regarding issues relating to Chinese
agricultural machinery demand.

•

Identify and assess Chinese agricultural policy and its impact on
agricultural machinery markets.

•

Determine the economic and political factors affecting Chinese
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farmers’ purchasing decisions and machinery use.
•

Obtain and analyze Chinese national statistical data regarding
historical agricultural machinery trends and other relevant
agricultural input and output trends.

•

Assess and analyze this information to determine the potential and
current agricultural machinery demand.

•

Conduct a case study of John Deere operations in China including
interviews with key players in the business.

•

Analyze John Deere’s business strategy, and formulate key
elements used in meeting agricultural machinery demand in China.

•

Edit, critique, and improve the final analysis, results, and
implications in answering the inquiry.

3.3 Overall Objective and Reasons Demand for
Farm Machinery Would Be Expected to Be
Expanding in China
The overall objective of this dissertation is to characterize the market
for agricultural machinery in China and to attempt to formalize an assessment
of the demand for agricultural machinery in China. There are several factors
that would suggest that the demand for farm machinery is growing in China,
and, as a result, opportunities for foreign agribusiness firms to market
agricultural machinery in China are expanding.
The primary reason one would expect the market for agricultural
machinery in China to be growing is the rapid growth of the Chinese economy
from a relatively low base (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1. Growth of the Chinese Economy from 1978-2006.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007.

Chinese agriculture has been characterized by small farms that are
very labor intensive (see Figure 3.2). However, the growth in the Chinese
economy has provided off-farm job opportunities for many Chinese individuals
in the cities, which tend to offer higher salaries than on-farm activities. The
resulting decrease in the rural labor force exacerbated by China’s one-child
policy would be expected to drive up the wage rates relative to other
agricultural inputs, resulting in an increasing demand for capital inputs such
as farm machinery.
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Figure 3.2. Average Area of Cultivated Land Under Management per Farmer.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007.

China’s land policy has also been liberalized, making it easier for
farmers to rent or lease property to others, thus allowing farm sizes to
increase─a necessary characteristic for many capital inputs with relatively
high fixed costs and economies of size. This may also make it more
economical for farmers to invest in farm equipment because they can spread
costs over more hectares, on the average, than they could previously.
China’s economic growth has provided the opportunity for Chinese
consumers to incorporate more protein into their diets (see Figure 3.3).
Protein is often provided by animal-based products, such as dairy and meat
products, which tend to require more inputs than grain-based products. The
result is an increasing demand for agricultural and food products in China.
Growing demand suggests higher prices for agricultural and food products,
which provides incentives for increasing output and also the efficiency of
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Figure 3.3. Per Capita GDP of China.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007.

output in the agricultural sector. Capital investments are a popular method for
increasing output and the efficiency of output. This also provides some
evidence of a growing demand for equipment in the agricultural and food
segments of the Chinese economy.
These factors all suggest that the demand for agricultural equipment is
expanding in China, and this is the hypothesis of this dissertation. However,
attempting to formally characterize the market for farm equipment in China is
complicated by a lack of publicly available information on this market that
could be used in a model of supply and demand of farm equipment in China.
This lack of data and the fact that China has only relatively recently liberalized
its market atmosphere to allow outside investment and entrepreneurship in
the agricultural and food sectors make it almost impossible to explain the
factors affecting the demand for agricultural machinery in China through the
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use of econometric methods. As a result, econometrics is not used to
describe machinery demand in China, but rather available data are used to
provide a description of recent and current conditions in this market. A case
study of an American machinery manufacturer (John Deere) is then used to
provide a detailed description of the opportunities and challenges related to
selling agricultural machinery in China.
This research examines the current demand in China for agricultural
machinery to better understand ways in which agribusiness firms can meet
that demand. In establishing this demand, a description of the supplydemand system relationships for agricultural machinery aids in the
understanding of how this market is evolving in China.

3.4 Determinants of Demand for Agricultural
Machinery
The demand for agricultural machinery can be described using the
economic theory for the demand for inputs in production. A production
function maps the relationship between the use of an input and an output. A
common specification for a production function is characterized by the CobbDouglas function which is:
(1)

,

where Y is output, C is capital, L is labor, and Z are other inputs such as land.
The parameters, α, β, and ∞ sum to one for constant returns to scale and are
greater than one for increasing returns to scale. Under Cobb-Douglas
technology, one would expect the relationship between capital (C) and output
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(Y) to be depicted similar to that shown in Figure 3.4, where increasing C
from zero initially increases Y and Y eventually reaches a maximum
associated with adding units of C and can actually decrease if additional units
of capital continue to be added. Because the change in Y associated with
changes in C are not constant, the marginal physical product (

or MPPc

can be used to describe the relationship between Y and C. MPPc is positive
and increasing initially, is positive but decreasing at the inflexion point,
becomes zero at the flat portion of the curve, and then becomes negative to
the right of the flat portion of the curve.

C=Capital
Y=Output

C1
Y

C°

Units of C
Figure 3.4. Depiction of Impact of Increases in Technology on a Production
Function.

34

Improvements in technology related to C will tend to shift the curve (C0)
upward and also shift the MPP0 to the right (becomes C1 is Figure 3.4). Or, in
other words, increases in the technology of capital lead to increasing levels of
output but also increases the MPPc.
Economic theory suggests that firms will invest in an input (in this case
capital) to the point where the value of its marginal product, defined as the
price of output Y multiplied by the (VMPc = PyMPPc), is equal to the price of
the input (Pc). This suggests that the equilibrium demand for the input can be
expressed as the following:
(2)

or

.

This implies that the demand for C is a function of the physical relationship
between Y and C (essentially the level of technology that C lends to output),
the price of C, and the price of Y.
The choice of other inputs, such as L and Z, also affect the choice of
the level of C because they are economic substitutes for C, where
mathematically this means that

< 0. For example, in Figure 3.5, the

isoquant, Y0, depicts all of the potential combinations of C and L that could be
used to produce a single level of output. The solid straight line between the x
and the y axes (R0) shows all of the possible combinations of C and L that
could be purchased given a firm’s budget constraint and the current prices for
units of C (r0) and L (w0). The slope of this line is the ratio of r0 and w0. The
tangency of Y0 and R0 identifies the optimum bundle of C and L to produce Y0
(L0 and C0). Now, if the price of L increases, then R0 shifts to R1 and a new
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tangency identifies a new bundle of inputs (L1 and C1). This demonstrates
that as the price of one substitute input increases relative to the other input,
the demand for the input whose price increased will decrease while the
demand for the other input will increase.
This suggests that the inverse demand function for farm machinery (Pc)
can be explained by the relative MPPs, prices of other inputs, MPPc, and the
price of agricultural outputs such as crops or livestock enterprises. The
reduction in the rural labor force would suggest that the wage rate or price of
labor is increasing in China. Agricultural land cannot actually be purchased in
China, but if rental and lease agreements are used as a proxy for the price of
land, one would expect that the cost of such arrangements has been
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Figure 3.5. Changes in Proportions of Inputs as Costs for One Input Changes.
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increasing with the liberalization of markets and the increasing demand for
agricultural products.
As the demand for agricultural products has increased (probably driven
by increases in consumer income in China and other locations), the price for
agricultural products and commodities has likely increased (Figure 3.5),
indicating that, in general, Py, has been increasing. The case study will
demonstrate that John Deere has been working to match and improve its
technology to fit conditions in China, such as the existence of relatively small
farms compared to other locations in the world. These efforts are likely
resulting in increasing MPPs for agricultural equipment offered by John Deere
and other machinery manufacturers in China. Each of these conditions (price
of competing inputs, price of agricultural products, and an increasing MPP for
equipment) suggest that the market for agricultural equipment in China should
be increasing.
A very simple model of the supply and demand for agricultural
machinery in China might be specified similar to the following:
(3)
(4)
(5)
where

,
and

are the demand and supply of machinery at time t,

respectively. PMt is the price of machinery, PSUBt is the price of substitute
inputs such as labor or land, PYt is the price of the agricultural output such as
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wheat, CSt is the costs firms incur in manufacturing agricultural machinery,
and TNt is a variable capturing changes in technology over time.
Equations (3)-(5) present a simple theoretical relationship representing
a possible economic explanation for the determinants of the market for
agricultural machinery. The parameters of the model depicted in equations
(3)-(5), or any other similar model, could be estimated econometrically to
achieve a statistically valid if not full explanation of what has driven the
demand for farm machinery in China in the past. An econometric model of
this type requires a complete time series for each of the variables indicated in
the model. This would be difficult in most situations, but is especially difficult
in China because a complete time series for each variable is not publicly
available for China. An econometric model, while providing explanations of
the past demand for agricultural machinery, does not necessarily provide all
the information necessary for developing future strategies to address the
market.
Other approaches such as strategic planning, business theory/models,
and case studies may be the best methods for developing strategies and
finding how to meet agricultural machinery demand. In the current instance,
publicly available data are not available to estimate the parameters of an
econometric model similar to the one specified in equations (3)-(5). Data
limitations in China are explained in more detail in the following section.
Other sections of this chapter will also explain the selection of an alternative
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method, a case study, which was selected as the basis of analysis to
determine the demand for agricultural machinery in China.

3.5 Available Data Sources
The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) publishes an annual
China Statistical Yearbook that contains general Chinese statistics from 1985
to present. They also publish a China Agriculture Yearbook (CAYB) focusing
on agricultural-related statistics covering the same years. However, some of
these statistics were started at later dates and may not include numbers for
all years from 1985 to present. These statistics include only a basic overview
of China with annual aggregated provincial and national numbers. Much of
the general statistics are now available online through the NBSC’s website at
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/.
The NBSC has completed only two agricultural censuses: one in 1996,
and another in 2006. Therefore, these data, while providing a helpful
benchmark, would not be sufficient to do a valid econometric analysis. The
data do, however, give a snapshot view of China’s rural inventory, and, with
the second agricultural census now available, a comparison over the ten
years can give some indication to the nation’s rural trends.
There are some provincial data publicly available, but these data are
difficult to access, do not appear to be standardized from province to province
(though improvements in standardization seem to be occurring), and most
provincial data are published only in Chinese. Due to the speed of change in
the Chinese economy, these available data do not give a good representation
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of what is currently occurring in the Chinese agricultural machinery market.
Given the scope of this research, these data challenges have contributed to
the decision of taking a more aggregate and holistic approach in analyzing
China’s agricultural machinery demand rather than estimating an econometric
model. However, available data are used to provide current benchmark
information about Chinese agriculture. These data are also used as a source
of supporting evidence to the case study method that will be described later in
this chapter.

3.6 Research Approach (Qualitative vs.
Quantitative)
One method that is useful in analyzing how a multi-national corporation
(MNC) can effectively meet agricultural machinery demand in China is to look
at a successful U.S. business in China that is already meeting this demand.
This business has many experiences and examples of applied business
theory in meeting agricultural machinery demand. Real-life insights about the
future of agribusiness in China, its agricultural machinery market, and
strategies used to address that market, can all be gained through this
analysis. This type of analysis is included in the case study research method.
According to Yin (1994 : 13):
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
•

investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life

context, especially when
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•

the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly

evident.”
2. The case study inquiry
•

Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be

many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
•

Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to

converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
•

Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to

guide data collection and analysis.
These criteria fit the objective of this dissertation to examine how
businesses can successfully meet demand for agricultural machinery in
China. This is a contemporary phenomenon occurring every day in the real
marketplace. It also has many variables that are combined in a company’s
overall success. Available secondary data analysis, multiple interviews, and
observational evidence can be combined to identify and confirm emergent
themes.
Using a case study as a research method is very beneficial when
certain circumstances arise. These include situations such as when it is
unrealistic, impractical, or impossible to use surveys, historical data, or other
forms of sampling that can be analyzed using statistical tools, or when these
methods alone are not adequate to justify an argument. Another example is
when one is asking a “how” or “why” question about contemporary events that
one cannot feasibly manipulate (Yin 1994 : 10): “The case study, like the
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experiment, does not represent a “sample,” and the investigator’s goal is to
expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).”
Manipulating a successful business in a contemporary Chinese market
is unrealistic. We can only observe and learn from their experiences in order
to understand how agricultural machinery demand is currently being met.
Another reason that a case study is essential in answering the proposed
question is the limited time and resources that are available in doing this
research. Because of this, other methods of research are impractical and
inappropriate (see Figure 3.6). These other methods would not allow
detailed, in-depth results that are needed to understand how businesses in
China are meeting agricultural machinery demand. They would only provide
numbers or a very limited qualitative response.
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much
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history
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case study
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no
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Figure 3.6. Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies.
Source: Yin 1994 : 6.

42

Knowing that a case study is the main method used to address this
research, we now need to discuss the different types of case studies that are
available. Case studies can use qualitative as well as quantitative data. A
single case or multiple cases can be used in case study research. Case
studies can also be holistic or embedded in nature (see Figure 3.7).
A single-case study is appropriate when resources and time are such
that only a single case can be studied feasibly. It is also necessary when
dealing with exceptions to the norm which cannot be duplicated. A single
revelatory case study can also be used when a phenomenon has not
previously been studied.

Holistic
(single unit of analysis)

Embedded
(multiple units of
analysis)

Single-case

Multiple-case

designs

designs

TYPE 1

TYPE 3

TYPE 2

TYPE 4

Figure 3.7. Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies.
Source: Yin 1994 : 39.
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A multiple-case study is beneficial when more than one case is
available for research. These multiple cases are not viewed as multiple
samples. They are used as a replication tool, just as an experiment would be
replicated to strengthen its validity. More than one case can be used to
strengthen the common themes that emerge.
When using either a single- or multiple-case study, it also must be
decided whether an embedded or holistic approach will be used. An
embedded case study design includes more than one unit of analysis. These
may be different projects in an organization or other units of analysis that can
be sampled or clustered in their analysis. A holistic case study design only
has a single unit of analysis and is used when an overall understanding is
being sought. Also, when no realistic unit of analysis can be determined,
holistic-type theories are, in general, used throughout the case study.
The case study design that is appropriate in addressing this
dissertation’s research question is a holistic, single-case study. Reasoning
for this includes time and resource limitations. It is not feasible to do an indepth investigation of more than one company in China. Also, it is difficult to
gain high-level access to multiple MNCs. Because of Chinese government
control, access to SOEs or private Chinese corporations is not highly feasible.
Therefore, a single U.S.-based MNC will be used as the case study company.
The main source of primary data comes from interviews with experts in
the Chinese agricultural economics and machinery fields. These expert
opinions bring qualitative viewpoints, insights, solutions, and information to
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the dissertation. It allows the rich experience of professionals in industry to
share their observations, challenges, and solutions. Where direct contact is
unavailable, this information is supplemented with published information
regarding the proposed topic that includes previous interviews or otherwise
documented expert opinion.
The reason for this more qualitative approach is due to the lack of
substantial secondary data in China relating to the components of demand for
agricultural machinery and how businesses have met that demand. The
company’s overall strategies of successfully meeting Chinese agricultural
machinery demand are what are being observed and analyzed. This question
cannot be fully answered with the use of quantitative data. Instead it will be
observed and discovered through qualitative analysis of the company.
The company which the case study will focus on is John Deere China
Investment Co., Ltd. (JDCI). This is the Chinese branch of John Deere, Inc.
As will be described in Chapter 4, other U.S.-based companies are not as
established in China or do not have a large Chinese market share compared
with John Deere. John Deere has had a presence in China since 1976.
Therefore, this company’s history, experience, and presence in China will
give more representative data and a broader view of the current dealings in
the Chinese agricultural machinery market compared to other corporations.

3.7 Case Study Method
Having decided the type of case study to perform and the company on
which to focus, initial efforts were made to contact John Deere to seek
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approval for this research. Through a contact, I was referred to the chief
economist at John Deere, Dr. J. B. Penn. Dr. Penn reviewed the research
proposal and helped to seek approval from his superiors for the research. I
was then referred to the president of JDCI, Mr. Douglas Roberts, for his
review and support in the project.
Once approval was given, Mr. Roberts asked for clarifications about
the specific information that was being requested from John Deere. A
general set of questions was prepared and provided to John Deere about
information that would be needed for the case study. This included questions
regarding John Deere’s history, background, and other questions eliciting
information needed to help in the preparation for the interviews. These
questions and the answers provided by John Deere also helped in the
development of additional questions used in the interviews (see Appendix D).
Along with the answers to these initial questions came an invitation to
visit John Deere’s Chinese operations to obtain added insights through a firsthand experience. I was also invited to conduct interviews with key individuals
in John Deere’s China operations to gather additional qualitative information
for the case study. Arrangements were then made for the visit to occur during
the week of October 19-25, 2008.
Answers to the initial set of questions were then reviewed for any new
insights that could be gained in preparation for the interviews with John Deere
management and other industry individuals in China. Some of the responses
to the initial set of questions raised additional questions, especially regarding
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specific details of the organizational workings in China. For example, one
initial question was: “How have current Chinese agricultural policies affected
John Deere tractors in China?” The response mentioned farm machinery
subsidy policy in China that was a major consideration affecting relationships
between John Deere and tractor and implement dealers in China. From this
response, it was determined that knowing how JDCI was dealing with this
situation would increase the quality and depth of this study. Therefore, more
specific questions about subsidy policies in China were included in the
interview questions.
The correspondence with and responses from JDCI also helped to
clarify which individuals in JDCI’s Chinese supply chain should be interviewed
(with JDCI’s approval). The initial questions were addressed to Mr. Roberts.
Mr. Roberts then distributed these questions to individuals within his
organization who he believed would be best to answer each question. From
the responses received, these individuals included people such as JDCI’s
marketing director. Identifying these individuals also allowed for the
development of a more targeted set of interview questions. It also helped to
determine the members of JDCI who should be interviewed. That is, this
allowed questions to be focused on specific areas of the supply chain.
In preparation for the visit, case study data collection methods were
reviewed and selected through additional research. Other case study method
resources, including textbooks and professors in the Jon M. Huntsman
School of Business and the College of Agriculture were consulted for any
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additional input and review. I originally requested to meet with multiple
individuals at different points in the supply chain at JDCI: multiple tractor
dealers, a state farm customer, and local Chinese farmers. However, due to
time and resource constraints, it was impractical to visit every location
originally requested. The decision was made to interview key individuals in
JDCI’s operations, along with a John Deere Chinese dealer, and some of
their typical Chinese customers.
The individuals to be interviewed were at different locations in China.
Therefore, a schedule was created to meet with as many people as possible,
given the time and resources available. The majority of the individuals from
JDCI were located at the Beijing corporate office, while others were located at
the Tianjin Economic Development Area (TEDA). The John Deere dealership
was located just outside of Beijing in northern Hebei province as were the
Chinese farmers who were to be interviewed.
Interviews were scheduled to last about one hour to show
consideration for the interviewee’s time constraints but which still allowed
adequate time for elaboration of answers and issues. The interviews were
conducted in English unless, due to language barriers, Chinese needed to be
used. If this was the case, the interviewer (myself) or other bilingual
individuals helped translate. Interviews were voice-recorded to ensure later
that the responses could be recalled accurately. After explaining the study to
interviewees, the interviewer requested permission to record the interview. I
explained that the recording would not be shared with others and would be
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used for reference purposes only. Notes were also taken as the interviews
took place.
The individuals selected to be interviewed at JDCI were those who
were most critical in helping to understand how JDCI has met Chinese
agricultural machinery demand. This was determined by focusing on
individuals who play a key part in the decision and management process at
JDCI. JDCI also helped to facilitate a meeting with one of its independent
dealers in northern Hebei. This dealership was chosen based on JDCI’s
recommendation that it was a good representation of a typical Chinese
agricultural equipment dealership. The dealership owner also asked four of
their local farmer customers to participate in this study. With JDCI’s approval
and the individuals’ time availability being considered, arrangements were
made to visit with these individuals.
Some of these individuals were recommended by JDCI after my arrival
in China to help me obtain a more complete picture of their operations. For
example, a meeting was arranged, which was not originally planned, with the
director of engineering because JDCI believed that this was an important part
of their business. Current engineering program directors were also
suggested. Through these individuals, a more detailed understanding of
JDCI’s challenges was obtained. This also added additional expertise in
describing how JDCI has successfully met demand in the Chinese market. It
gave specific insight into general issues initially described by JDCI.
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As the interviews progressed and questions were answered,
individuals who were interviewed at JDCI also referred me to others in the
company who could add more detail. One example was when the supply
chain director referred me to JDCI’s legal counsel to help answer how JDCI
deals with non-compliant suppliers in China. The government relations
manager and business planning and development manager were also
referred to me in a similar manner. Listed in Table 3.1 are the individuals
interviewed and their role in JDCI’s supply chain.
The interviews were conducted one-on-one. The only exception was
the interview with the Chinese farmers. Because of time and availability
constraints, the dealership brought all four farmers together to be interviewed
at the same time. In this case, the questions were posed to the group and
then the replies of each individual farmer were recorded.

Table 3.1. List of Interviewed Individuals
John Deere China Investment Inc.
President
Order Fulfillment Specialist
Director, Supply Management
Strategic Sourcing,
Supplier Development
General Counsel (Legal)
Director, Sales and Customer
Support (Marketing)
Director, Engineering
Apollo Tractor Program Manager
GT5 Transmission Program Manager
Government Relations Manager
Director, Manufacturing (Operations)
Manager, Business Planning and
Development

John Deere Dealer
Northern Hebei Tractor Dealer

Chinese Farmers
Farmer 1
Farmer 2
Farmer 3
Farmer 4
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In developing the questions for these interviews, the person being
interviewed and the role they played in the Chinese agricultural machinery
industry were considered. For example, the questions directed to the
Chinese farmers (agricultural machinery consumers) focused on how they
viewed agricultural machinery and products with which they had experience,
not on the details of JDCI’s operations they would most likely not understand
(see Figure 3.8).
Interview questions were developed that were considered to be free of
bias, appropriate for the audience for which they were intended, and to give
an opportunity for individual input (or in other words, somewhat open-ended).
The questions did not directly seek any proprietary information. The issues
and information shared by JDCI in their responses to the initial set of
questions were a focus of the inquiries. This was done to aid in achieving a
richer understanding of these issues, to add detail, and to clarify JDCI’s

1. Why did you buy John Deere equipment? What equipment did you
purchase?
2. To you, what is the most important reason that you wanted to use
agricultural machinery?
3. Why not hire more labor instead?
4. How long have you used John Deere machinery?
5. How do you believe it has benefited your operations and its efficiency?
6. Do you believe other farmers would like to implement machinery in
their operations? Would you encourage them to do so? Why or why
not?
7. Any other information regarding John Deere, machinery in general,
that you believe is important?

Figure 3.8. Interview Questions to Large Chinese Farming Contractors.
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dealings in the Chinese market. The issues seen in previous research (see
Chapter 2) were also a focus of these interview questions. The questions
focused on identifying what needed to be done in the Chinese market to
successfully meet the demand for agricultural machinery, how industry
players perceived the market, and how challenges of the market (i.e., rural
income, land rights, etc.) have been dealt with. For a complete list of the
interview questions used, see Appendix E.
After each interview was completed, the participants were thanked for
their time and cooperation with the case study. Then I recorded on paper any
additional thoughts I had about the interview. This included, when relevant,
observations relating to the interview location which could add qualitative
description of the Chinese agricultural machinery market and industry.
Part of the initial preparation for the visit to China was to address the
issue of confidentiality. Obviously, the information and access given to me by
JDCI was done based on trust. Therefore, to help ensure confidentiality for
those involved in the case study, I explicitly discussed what the study entailed
and that the details shared would only be used with their permission. JDCI
was informed that the final results of the study would be shared and verified
with them before they were made public. This received JDCI’s consent. Care
was also taken to safeguard any information which JDCI provided for the
study until their approval to include it in the final product was received.
JDCI’s requests that certain information be omitted or generalized for
proprietary purposes were also honored.
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3.8 Post Visit
After the visit to JDCI, the information gathered was compiled into a
more complete and organized form. The interview notes and recordings were
used to create a detailed description of each interview. Key ideas and words
being communicated by the interviewees were used. The main ideas and
details were used to report answers to the questions regarding the Chinese
agricultural machinery market. Thus, the compilation and summary of what
was obtained from the interviews was much more effective than a direct
transcript of the interview. This summary resulted in 70 pages of information
obtained from the interviews which could be more easily analyzed,
understood, and communicated in written format than direct transcripts of the
interviews.
After compiling the summaries of these interviews, each interview was
codified for easier reference purposes (see Table 3.2). This allowed easier
referencing of exemplar quotations or other information when used in the
dissertation. For example, when information from the interview with the order
fulfillment specialist was used, the code “JDOFS” would follow, to allow the
reader to identify from where the information came.
Each interview was analyzed separately for its main points. These
main points focused on how JDCI has met the demand for agricultural
machinery in China, how they perceive the market, and their experiences
within this market. Some practices that JDCI have implemented were
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Table 3.2. Codification of Interviews
Interview

Code

President Oct. 20
President Oct. 21
Order Fulfillment Specialist
Director, Supply Management Strategic Sourcing, Supplier
Development
General Counsel (Legal)
Director, Sales and Customer Support (Marketing)
Director, Engineering
Apollo Tractor Program Manager
GT5 Transmission Program Manager
Government Relations Manager
Director, Manufacturing (Operations)
Manager, Business Planning and Development
Northern Hebei Tractor Dealer
Chinese Farmer 1
Chinese Farmer 2
Chinese Farmer 3
Chinese Farmer 4

JDP20
JDP21
JDOFS
JDSCM
JDLC
JDM
JDE
JDAPM
JDTPM
JDGRM
JDO
JDBPD
TD
CF1
CF2
CF3
CF4

standard throughout their world-wide operations. However, particular
attention was made to highlight points that were unique to the Chinese market.
In the case of the tractor dealer and Chinese farmers, their views of the
Chinese agricultural machinery market were highlighted together with their
perceptions of how industry players viewed JDCI’s approaches to meeting
agricultural machinery demand. Each individual interviewed also had many
important points of information that were also noted pertaining to their specific
place in JDCI or the agricultural machinery market.
Once the main points of each interview had been identified, multiple
interviews were then compared to identify common themes across interviews.
Identifying common themes with multiple sources strengthens the validity of
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these themes. Slight differences and additions of information to these themes
were noted and added to their description in the case study. Not every point
of information within a theme was mentioned by multiple individuals.
However, the main ideas within a theme usually had multiple individuals who
validated these main ideas. When a main point was mentioned by only one
individual, it was added only if it was believed to be an essential part of
understanding the agricultural machinery market in China or of meeting that
market’s demands.
When available and relevant, sources other than the visit to JDCI were
also used to add validity to the themes identified. Through the use of multiple
sources, data triangulation was achieved. These additional sources included
published secondary data and information such as found in national statistical
databases, news articles, and organizational publications. Time series
statistical data was analyzed for relevant trends that supported or
contradicted findings from the JDCI visit. This contributed to a more complete
and valid picture and description of these themes.
After the common themes and important points of the case study were
determined and analyzed for relevance in answering the questions of this
research, they were compiled into Chapter 4 as the results of the case study.

3.9 Conclusion
There are many quantitative research methods that can be used in
defining demand for a product. However, due to inadequate data and the
scope of this dissertation, available quantitative data were used as supporting
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evidence to a more qualitative approach. Also, in answering how a business
can meet agricultural machinery demand in China, the use of a case study is
the most appropriate method. The case study of John Deere is a good
representation of how a corporation has met agricultural machinery demand
in China.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction
This dissertation endeavors to identify, in general terms, the demand
for agricultural machinery in China and also uses a case study of JDCI to
examine how a specific company is meeting this demand. This chapter
presents the results of the research completed to address these issues and
the analyses of these results.
First, trends in the Chinese agricultural machinery market were
discussed along with other relevant quantitative data. By analyzing available
secondary data, some important points regarding how the agricultural
machinery market has evolved over time were understood. This
understanding helps one to project how this market may continue to evolve in
the future. The results of the case study analysis were then presented and
explained. The case study was organized along the lines of major themes
relating to the business environment and JDCI’s decisions and strategies.
The case study includes data from sources other than the JDCI interviews in
China that were used to support particular points in the case study.

4.2 Quantitative Results
The number of tractors used in China and the change in the quantity of
tractors in China over time were graphed to identify trends in the market
(Figure 4.1). CAYB data were used to develop this illustration. FAO data
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were also graphed to compare multiple data sources to validate these trends
(Figure 4.2). Different sources may use different methodologies in obtaining
the data. This is especially true in China where secondary data have been
difficult to obtain. But general trends should still be identifiable, even if figures
are different from different sources.
As seen in Figure 4.1, there has been a strong upward trend in
agricultural tractors in China during the past 25 years, and especially during
the last decade. Even though Figure 4.2 shows a more aggregated
description of agricultural machinery totals and for more years than Figure 4.1,
Figure 4.2 verifies that there has been a significant upward trend in the
amount of agricultural machinery inventory in China during the past two
decades.
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Figure 4.1. Agricultural Machinery Quantities in China.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007b.
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Figure 4.2. FAO Agricultural Machinery Quantities in China.
Data Source: FAO 2009.

Since 1985, there has been a much larger increase in the number of
small tractors than large- and medium-sized tractors. This makes sense
because of the relatively small size of farms in China. To help reinforce this
point, data from the recently completed Chinese agricultural census were also
graphed (Figure 4.3). Most farmers able to purchase machinery do not need
large or medium tractors because of small farm size, but the growing number
of tractors in China suggests that capital is being substituted for labor in an
increasing fashion.
Figure 4.3 also indicates that the number of implements for small
tractors increased at a faster rate than implements for large tractors. This
was expected due to implements being complementary goods of tractors and
being purchased to match the size of tractors. Consequently, an increasing
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China Census: Agricultural Machinery
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Figure 4.3. Machinery Data Comparison.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (1997; 2007a).

inventory of smaller tractors would be expected to coincide with an increasing
inventory of correspondingly small implements. Vehicles for agricultural use
also experienced a greater increase than large machinery during this same
time period.
Another factor in the larger number of small tractors in China than
large tractors is that most Chinese farmers have not used agricultural
machinery before. Because most consumers are risk-averse, when he/she
tries a new product, he/she is likely to invest in tractors or implements
requiring less capital outlays and risk than large equipment (Friedman and
Savage 1948). Therefore, for most Chinese consumers who are
inexperienced with agricultural machinery, their first machinery purchase will
likely be one with less economic risk than a big purchase. Smaller tractors,
implements, and vehicles for agricultural use all represent smaller
investments than larger machinery and related implements.
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Not only would most Chinese farmers be expected to want to limit risk
when purchasing machinery, but most of them cannot afford to make large
investments. The average income per farmer in China in 2008 was 4,761
yuan ($697). Although this figure is double what average farm income was in
2000, its level still limits the ability of the average Chinese farmer to invest in
large tractors.
Data from state farms in China also contain additional insights
regarding agricultural machinery trends. Cultivated land on China state farms
represents roughly only about 3% of all cultivated land in China. This figure
(3%) was calculated by dividing total state cultivated farmland reported in
CAYB by national cultivated area.
However, even though only a relatively small part of all cultivated land
in China is in state-operated farms, because state farms are government
controlled and managed, policies and practices used on state farms would
likely be good indicators of future trends in government policy. The policies
and practices on state farms are government supported, and as government
priorities change, they will most likely be implemented first in governmentcontrolled entities, and then government policies and legislation would be
implemented on a more nationwide level. Therefore, by analyzing the trends
in practices and policies related to China state farms, future trends in
nationwide policy related to agriculture may possibly be identified.
Over the past few decades, a trend of increasing mechanization in
agriculture is implied by a number of factors. First, as seen in Figure 4.4, the
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number of employees on Chinese state farms has decreased. Next, the
number of Chinese state farms has also decreased but the area of cultivated
land in state-operated farms has increased (see Figure 4.5). This implies that
the use of agricultural machinery is more efficient on larger state farms than
on smaller farms. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, actual agricultural machinery
use on state farms increased dramatically between 1993 and 2006.
These indicators imply that the Chinese government will continue to
support the use of agricultural machinery throughout China as policies are
implemented that favor the use of more machinery. It is also implied that
legislation that will help farmers increase farm size and agricultural machinery
use will probably be supported, thus making the use of farm machinery more
economical and widespread.
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Figure 4.4. Employees on China State Farms.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007b.
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Figure 4.5. China State Farm Trends.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007b.
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Figure 4.6. Agricultural Machinery Use on China State Farms.
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007b.
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4.3 History of John Deere in China
The first visit to China by John Deere executives occurred in 1976.
This visit was made by former CEO William Hewitt, who headed the
U.S.-China Business Council that was then visiting China. Two years later,
John Deere was invited by Chinese officials to participate in “Friendship
Farms” where John Deere provided some tractors and combines to China.
In 1982 the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of
Mining and Engineering Industries (MMEI) approached Deere to enter
into five ‘Tech Transfer’ relationships with Jiamusi and Keifang
(combines) plus Shenyang, Tianjin, and Changchun (tractors). Deere
saw this as an opportunity to become further entrenched in the market
with one or two generation older technology. After ten years (1991),
these tech transfer relationships were suspended with only Shenyang
and Jiamusi actually having succeeded in adopting more than just
Deere cosmetics into their own Soviet rooted designs (Doug Roberts,
JDCI President).
The first joint venture for John Deere in China was set up in Jiamusi in
1997 and later became a Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprise (WOFE) in 2004
under the name John Deere Jialian Harvester Co. Ltd. (JDJW). Another joint
venture, John Deere Tiantuo Co. Ltd. (JDT), was formed with Tianjin Tractor
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. in 2000. This was done in part to gain further market
share in the smaller horsepower tractors and to gain greater access to the
Chinese agricultural machinery market. In 2005, John Deere opened a new
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transmission factory in the Tianjin Economic Development area (TEDA)
named John Deere Tianjin Co. Ltd. (JDTW). The most recent addition to
JDCI is the acquisition of Ningbo Benye Tractor Co. Ltd. in August of 2007.
Again, this joint venture gave greater capabilities to JDCI in producing low
horsepower tractors and increasing market access. John Deere’s history in
China has spanned many decades and JDCI is continuing to grow. A timeline
of John Deere in China is presented as Figure 4.7.
The case study of JDCI focuses on how this U.S.-based company has
met the growing demand for agricultural machinery in China. As the study
progressed, certain overarching themes were identified which emanated from
multiple interviews. Some of these themes were of a general nature, such as
standardized practices throughout the global industry. But most of the
overarching themes were specific to the Chinese market. Those themes
specific to China were used to help answer the inquiries of this dissertation.
The themes identified were:
•

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)

•

Government Relations

•

Legal Environment

•

Supplier Relations

•

Fast and Growing Market

•

Chinese Agricultural Machinery Market and JDCI’s Marketing

•

Order Fulfillment Process

I will now examine each theme in detail.
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Figure 4.7. John Deere in China Timeline.
Source: John Deere Journal 2007 : 6-7.
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4.4 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
IPR issues and concerns in China relating to agricultural machinery
have had a long-standing history. These issues relate to trademark, copyright,
patents, and other IPR infringements and enforcement or lack of enforcement.
It is estimated that about 20% of all products in the Chinese market are
counterfeit or pirated (American Embassy in Beijing, 2004). Therefore, the
interviews included questions aimed at identifying JDCI’s experience with IPR
in China. The questions also tried to identify how JDCI has dealt with these
issues.
The president of JDCI indicated that on average, about 80% of IPR
cases put through litigation proceedings in China are found in favor of the
plaintiff (the company holding the IPR). Because of this, JDCI has made it a
goal to actively pursue IPR violations. “If companies are willing to actively
pursue [IPR], they will be rewarded” (JDP21).
JDCI is also developing new technology specific to the Chinese market
and agricultural processes within the Chinese market. “The patenting
process takes longer [in China] and is far from perfect, but John Deere plans
to patent the technology they develop in China” (JDP21).
JDCI’s Legal Counsel also discussed IPR as an issue and indicated
that,
IPR enforcement [in China] is an issue, but great improvement
has been made especially within the last 5 years. Larger cities such as
Beijing, Shanghai, etc. … have better enforcement with judges who
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understand the new legislation and have some experience with it.
Rural areas are a challenge and IPR legal action in these areas is
sometimes not worth the cost of litigation (JDLC).
Because of this, JDCI completed a cost-benefit analysis of pursuing litigation
on certain IPR issues. Sometimes, if the potential future harm of an IPR
violation is large if left unchecked, then even though the immediate financial
benefit is low, JDCI will take action.
Although JDCI has experienced IPR problems in China, the outlook
relating to IPR future issues is toward improvement. Additional evidence of
this is new legislation being considered by the Chinese government. “IPR
legislation is being revised including copyright, trademark, and patent
legislation and is planned to be ready in the next 1 to 2 years (2009-2010)”
(JDLC).
Regardless of what new legislation is being considered, enforcement
of IPR needs to be effective. New laws mean nothing without enforcement by
government officials. Until adequate enforcement and legislation is in place,
JDCI will be cautious about how its intellectual property (IP) is handled in
China. This is especially the case for John Deere technology that is used in
the production and design of new products in China.
Another example of IPR issues was mentioned by the Director of JDCI
engineering and regards spare parts and accessories. He stated,
This is where protection of IPR is important in a place where
[the Chinese] are masters of duplication. Service parts can be a big
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part of your business. Having the protection to avoid duplication of
service parts is a challenge. If the part is relatively simple, it is easy for
them to make it and sell it at half price (JDE).
Protecting IP before and after market is a priority for JDCI.
JD is very careful to protect IP they have in other places in the
world besides China. They do this by restricting access of engineers
and others in China into John Deere global systems. There isn’t proof
that China will deal with IPR issues or they may not be prosecutable
through the usual systems. Expatriates have access to [John Deere
global systems] but the Chinese do not. This also raises challenges
for employees who need to get their jobs done but are restricted
because of these issues. It is hard for Chinese John Deere engineers
who want to be treated like any other John Deere engineer (JDE).
Because of the restrictions placed upon John Deere’s Chinese
employees as a method to protect IP, some adjustments to regular processes
have been made. “They haven’t had to redesign systems but they have had
to adopt a ‘just what we need’ policy: getting agreement on what they need to
do their jobs and get access to that and nothing more. In other areas [of the
world], if you have access to the system, you have access to everything”
(JDE).
As IPR issues continue to be a factor in China, JDCI has taken steps
to protect their investments. They will actively pursue IPR violations and seek
to utilize current legislation to protect current and future IP in China. JDCI
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also exercises caution in how Chinese operations use current John Deere IP.
Due to the current environment existing in China, restriction on IP access is
necessary to safeguard John Deere technology. Adjustments to product
development processes and procedures have been made to continue to
successfully meet the demands of the Chinese agricultural machinery market.

4.5 Government Relations
Government relations are crucial to, and can be an effective part of,
doing business in China. Because China has a centrally controlled
government, new legislation can have a very quick and powerful effect on any
business. Therefore, it is very important that any company understand how
potential changes in government policies and laws will affect the business in
the future. Local, provincial, and national government levels all have
separate ways of affecting industry and business requirements and standards.
As a company becomes better at cooperating with these decision-making
officials, both the government and business can benefit from more
transparent and efficient operations.
One example of how the cultivation of government relations has been
beneficial was shared by JDCI’s president regarding JDCI’s harvester factory
JDJW.
A harvester company that received John Deere technology in
the 1970’s friendship farms now has set up a factory right next to John
Deere Harvester factory and produces yellow and green machinery
called Jiangliao John Deere. They would also stop customers from
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picking up their John Deere orders or would redirect them to their own
factory. Therefore, John Deere petitioned officials to stop the use of
the John Deere name or John Deere (who are investing and are the
province’s largest employer of 1,600 employees at that location) will
stop production in that city immediately. Officials complied. To solve
the other problems, more government relations are being developed to
hopefully have the factory moved to a location other than the John
Deere site (JDP20).
Because of good communication with government officials, a very
important issue to JDCI’s business was resolved. Further government
relations will also play a key role in this and many other issues of JDCI doing
business in China.
Sometimes, government legislation may not always affect business
operations in the most preferred way. But it is still important to be a part of
the decisions made to have the issue handled as smoothly as possible. This
can often be challenging.
Developing government relations includes many challenges.
The Tiantuo John Deere factory is having to be moved to another
location due to government economic development plans in Tianjin.
The Chinese government has agreed to pay all of the relocation
expenses but agreeing on this price has taken a great deal of time and
effort over 3 years. A new factory is being built on the Joint Venture
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(JV) partner’s land in [TEDA] in close proximity to John Deere’s
already existing transmission manufacturing facility (JDP20).
The need to focus on government relations was explained by JDCI’s
president.
Don’t try and tell the Chinese government what to do, help them
understand that you have some solutions to their problems. Show
them how you can help the Chinese people and improve the current
situation (i.e. setting up demonstration farms and showing solutions to
the people and government and not just trying to collect the money or
sell a product) (JDP21).
To further facilitate government relations, JDCI has recently hired a
government relations manager to help them function more effectively in China.
“As we matured as a global organization, we realized the benefit of driving
government decisions here (or at least finding out earlier)” (JDP21). The new
government relations manager “…will help [JDCI] see what is coming down
the pipe and to influence it just as lobbying in Washington is useful” (JDP20).
Communication with government officials is something that JDCI
constantly needs to do to be effective in their Chinese operation. Through
their new government relations manager, better communication with Chinese
government officials is occurring than would have been possible before. One
example of how knowing what to expect in future Chinese legislation can be
helpful regards workers’ unions.
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The Chinese government isn’t as open as the U.S., but they will
send drafts of legislation out for businesses and organizations such as
the American Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. China Business
Council to comment and make suggestions on. They recently sent
legislation regarding unions and John Deere is planning to offer a
union option to all of its workers in China (JDP20).
Because a preliminary understanding exists regarding which potential
legislation is coming, John Deere can be better prepared to facilitate any
changes to its business that may need to occur relative to the proposed
legislation.
This is especially important in China where legislation and policies are
changing very rapidly. “The People’s Republic of China has had policy
changes in November 2007 and March 2008. Government policy changes
frequently in China. Therefore, there is a larger ‘policy risk’ of doing business
in China” (JDGRM). Because legislation changes at a rapid pace, it is also
critical to communicate any concerns regarding new legislation before the
legislation is put into effect.
If there is something that JD believes would have a negative
impact …they have an obligation to do all they can to help the MOA
understand why and give them suggestions. In China they previously
have had a challenge in doing so. The new government relations
manager … is something that will help this improve (JDE).
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A conversation with the government relations manager identified what
has helped to facilitate government communication.
A key contributor to Chinese government communication is that
whatever your corporate goals are for China, they need to be aligned
with the goals of the current government. You need to show a
common interest. Then communicate this well and in a way that
government officials will understand (JDGRM).
As these common goals are communicated, suggestions can also be made to
help officials understand how one’s business can help meet these goals.
There may be issues affecting the industry, and as one is able to give viable,
favorable solutions to these problems, future legislation may be improved to
the benefit of the business, industry, and country.
A few of the current issues being considered by the Chinese
government that JDCI believes are important to their business and the
agricultural machinery industry are discussed below. Not only are specific
issues important to these entities, but how they are handled and interpreted
are also important.
Land reform, especially in regard to newly proposed legislation, is
important.
It seems the trend is to increase security of land tenure for
Chinese farmers. One evidence of this is a change of wording in the
new legislation from the previous ‘chang qi’ (長期) to ‘chang jiu’ (長久).
The translated meaning is from the ‘extended date’ to the ‘old or
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ancient period of time’ (JDGRM).
Food security goals related to grain production were also discussed by
JDCI with Heilongjiang province given as an example.
The responsibility of ¼ of the new grain increase is appointed to
this province. To accomplish this goal, an increased [amount] of
agricultural machinery will be required. Therefore, John Deere’s
relations with the national, provincial, and local government and an
understanding of their implementation methods will be critical for John
Deere’s success in being a part of meeting this new demand (JDGRM).
Large equipment would be required but the government is
looking at a European manufacturer to fill that need because John
Deere does not currently produce large horsepower (hp) tractors in
China. The government also felt that John Deere’s time in transporting
large machinery to China was too long. This was mainly due to the
government not requesting the machinery until a very late date
compared to the date it was needed (JDGRM).
Therefore, helping the government understand why this occurred and how
JDCI can effectively be a part of meeting this demand is a very important part
of JDCI’s business.
There are many organizations within the central government that
determine legislation in China. JDCI was asked which government
organizations they deal with most frequently. These Chinese government
organizations are listed in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Chinese Government Organizations JDCI Most Frequently Deals
With
Chinese Government Organizations
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)
Ministry of Commerce (MofCom)
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MOEP)
Administration of Quality, Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine
(AQSIQ)
State Administration of Taxation
General Administration of Customs
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
(A new ministry started March, 2008): Ministry of Industry and Information
Development Research Center (DRC)
State councils
Source: JDGRM.

Because government relations are an ongoing process, I inquired as to
how JDCI can continue to improve these relations.
Improvement needs to be made. The departments of John
Deere need to communicate with the government together, in a sense,
to allow John Deere to have a unified goal and voice that the Chinese
government hears. Currently, different divisions of John Deere
communicate directly with government officials to handle their separate
affairs and issues. This has resulted in an uncoordinated and less
efficient effort (JDGRM).
Being able to effectively build relations with government officials in
China is an essential part of doing business there. National, provincial, and
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local level relations all are important factors when implementing business
operations and goals at each level. Understanding how to identify future
changes in the fast-paced Chinese government will help any company
become better prepared to do business in China now and in the future.
Influencing and communicating with policy makers will benefit a business and
the industry as both can make more well-informed decisions as a result of
communication.

4.6 Legal Environment
China has a centrally planned economy with a legal environment much
different from the United States. New and current legislation changes the
way local or foreign-based corporations do business in China. The
interpretation and implementation of legislation unique to China also affects
what businesses must do to be legally compliant. The current legal situation
and legal issues specifically important to the agricultural machinery industry
and JDCI are highlighted and discussed. Three subtopics will be discussed:
legislation, subsidies, and merger and acquisition (M&A)/ JV.

4.6.1 Legislation
JDCI’s legal counsel explained some of the recent government trends
in China. “The current regime (Hu jintao) is moving to a more individualistic
approach compared to historical regimes. More legislation has been put in
place or revised that is moving China in this direction” (JDLC). With a more
individualistic approach, additional power is given to the Chinese consumer.
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Increased numbers of products are now becoming available to the Chinese
as well. The support of this approach allows more foreign businesses to be a
part of the Chinese market. Therefore, businesses need to consider how this
will affect their customers, their competition’s ability to enter the market, and
many other business factors.

4.6.2 Subsidies
A major legislative action which passed in 2004 has changed how the
agricultural machinery industry functions in China. This action provided for
the subsidization by provincial and national governments of the purchase of
agricultural machinery by farmers. “To sell machinery in China you need to
be on the government subsidy list. Regulations are very strict and once
applied for, it takes one year to get on the list” (JDP20). As mentioned in
Chapter 2, government subsidization of agricultural machinery purchases
currently compensates farmers for up to 30% of the purchase price of
machinery. Therefore, most farmers will not purchase machinery that is not
on the subsidy list.
A conversation with a JDCI dealer again emphasized the importance of
subsidies.
Ninety-eight percent of tractors sold are ones that are
subsidized. The subsidy is 30% of the price. One tractor is around
20,000 RMB. The 2% without subsidies are sold to farmers who don’t
want to wait a whole year to buy a subsidized tractor and because all
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of this year’s subsidized tractors have been sold, they will purchase
one (TD).
Each province has its own variation on subsidy implementation.
The agricultural machinery subsidies started in 2005 and this policy is
very important to John Deere’s business in China. After the PRC
congress meets, implementation measures are addressed and
decisions about implementation of policies are made. Each Ministry
(and province) will have their own focus in the implementation of a
particular policy (JDGRM).
Therefore, JDCI’s focus on meeting subsidy requirements has to deal with
each province’s implementation measures.
An overview of the current agricultural machinery subsidy process and
implementation was provided by JDCI together with additional information
from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Since 2004, the government has provided a subsidy for the
purchase of agricultural machinery. The eligible entities are individual
farmers but also so called specialised households and agricultural
machine service delivery organisations. In 2008… the geographical
coverage extended from around two-thirds of agricultural counties to all
counties in China. The programme compensates the cost of
purchases by reimbursing the purchaser or compensating the seller for
20% to 30% of the purchase price. The programme is implemented at
the provincial level and it is up to local governments to decide on the
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machinery and models eligible for the subsidy. The subsidy has been
used to target the mechanisation of wheat harvesting and rice planting,
but in 2007 trials started to include support for mechanisation of corn
harvesting (OECD 2008).
To qualify for the subsidy list, some preliminary evaluations must take
place. The list is updated once per year, and if the deadline is missed, the
product is delayed an entire year from being placed on the subsidy list. This
does not preclude a company from putting machinery on the market, but the
machinery will most likely not sell well due to the high percentage of the cost
covered by farmers if the government subsidy is not available.
You have to sell 30 tractors before May-June timeframe and
then give 5 tractors to the government to be tested and be evaluated.
These 30 tractors are sold at a lower price and then followed and
documented to help in the evaluation. By the end of the year, the MOA
makes their decision on additions to the subsidy list. They will allow
John Deere and others to make minor changes after the approval
(JDAPM).
Part of qualifying for the subsidy list is to have each tractor model
comply with safety and performance testing.
Understanding the MOA requirements for subsidy is something
that everyone in their organization in China has had to understand and
they have learned a lot regarding this. The objective of the MOA is
similar to the Nebraska test that confirms that farmers are getting what
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they are paying for and not getting junk. It tests horsepower, drawbar
power, torque rise, fuel economy, safety, noise, and others (JDE).
“Things that the government evaluates and tests include: brakes, draft power,
drawbar power, PTO, hydraulic lift power, noise, specifications, and others”
(JDAPM).
The level of subsidy provided to farmers has been increasing every
year since subsidies were implemented (see Figure 4.8).
The subsidy fund increased from CNY 480 million (USD 58
million) in 2004 to CNY 3.3 billion (USD 439 million) in 2007, including
CNY 2 billion (USD 266 million) from the central government and CNY
1.3 billion (USD 173 million) of so called matching funds from local
governments. In 2008, the fund from the central government alone
increased to CNY 4 billion (USD 580 million) (OECD 2008).

Government Subsidy to
Ag. Machinery
250

US $ in million

200

150

100

50

0

2004

2005

2006

Central govt. subsidy
Local govt. subsidy

Figure 4.8. Chinese Government Subsidy Levels.
Source: JDCI.
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This trend indicates that increasing investment in agricultural machinery is a
high priority for the Chinese government and further changes in subsidy
legislation and implementation will continue to greatly affect the agricultural
machinery industry.
Not only are subsidies for agricultural machinery increasing, but the
requirements to receive placement on the subsidy list are changing.
The MOA also plays a key role in advancing agriculture by
mandating what technology they want to see in tractors used in China.
An example is that all transmissions must be collar shift or constant
mesh transmissions. This can drive innovations [in the Chinese
agricultural machinery market], even though they already exist in other
places, it is something that will speed up technology (JDE).
The customers may not ask for it and they may not care much about the
added cost of production resulting from the addition of new technology, but
because the government mandates that new technology be incorporated into
new machinery, it will be adopted faster. These technology mandates are a
unique part of China’s legal environment.
These agricultural subsidies are part of the Chinese government’s
plans to help increase farmer productivity and rural incomes. Other new
agricultural policies were discussed in Chapter 2. As Chinese government
investment in agriculture has continued to increase (see Figure 4.9), the
likelihood of farmers being able to invest in machinery has also increased.

82

Government Rural Investment ($ billion)
$50
$40
$30
$20
$10
$0

2004

2005

2006

Figure 4.9. Chinese Government Rural Investment.
Source: JDCI.

This is another indication of long-term improvement of the machinery industry
as well as governmental support of the Chinese agricultural machinery
industry. Additional evidence that government subsidies are changing the
Chinese farmer’s purchasing decisions and increasing the demand for
agricultural machinery in China is obtained from interviews with the farmers.
CF1 “Farms 300 mu which is rented, owns 30 mu, and does service
contracting on 600-700 mu. This is his 2nd year of farming with his
current tractor which is an 80 hp John Deere tractor bought in Oct,
2007. He previously has owned a 10 hp tractor purchased in 1988”
(CF1).
CF2 “Contracts 400 mu and owns 200 mu. This is his 1st year farming
(2008) with his two new 82 hp John Deere tractors. He previously
purchased in 1990 a small 15hp tractor” (CF2).
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CF3 “Contracts 300 mu and owns 10 mu. 2008 is his first year farming
with his new 82 hp John Deere tractor. He previously purchased in
1987 a 55 hp Tiantuo tractor and a small 12 hp tractor” (CF3).
CF4 “Contracts 400 mu and does farm any of his own. This is his first
year farming with his new 82 hp John Deere tractor. He previously
purchased in the 1980’s, two small 12 hp tractors” (CF4).
All of these farmers purchased their first tractors in the 1980s and have
not decided to purchase larger and newer equipment in comparison until
recently when subsidies have been implemented. Increasing farmer income
is also a factor, but these farmers also indicate that government subsidies
have sped up their decision.
The increase in agricultural machinery numbers have also had
additional effects on the number of mu service contracted by farmers and
therefore will affect their ability to increase income from agricultural machinery
investments. The farmers mentioned that in this area, on average, they
would service contract 600 mu, but this year, more tractors are being used
and, as can be seem in the above quotes, most farmers are servicing
annually less mu than before.

4.6.3 M&A/JV
Setting up new businesses and the location of businesses are also
regulated to a degree by the Chinese government. When companies wish to
grow using M&A options, the Chinese government must first approve the
action. This also occurs in the United States under certain circumstances
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when very large companies are involved in the M&A action and anti-trust
issues or national security issues may be involved. But in China, government
approval is always a factor, especially when a large number of competitors
are SOEs.
Recently, JDCI acquired a privately owned Chinese competitor, Ningbo
Benye. This was done to increase market share and to enhance low-hp
tractor production. Government response to this acquisition was positive.
The Government was very supportive of John Deere. John
Deere has history with the Chinese government through technology
transfers and friendship farms. Within the 30 years of the Chinese
opening, many companies have come and gone, but John Deere has
stuck with it. The government has been very supportive of John Deere
because they know they are trying to help the Chinese farmers and the
Chinese people (JDP21).
However, not every joint-venture or acquisition is always approved nor
is this always a smooth process through the Chinese government. One
example is the recent attempt at acquisition by Agco.
Agco [has] tried to acquire a majority share in China First
Tractor [Co.] (CFT) over the last 1 and ½ years and was unsuccessful
as the government decreed that at no time will a foreign entity own any
part of CFT. Agco’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) sent a letter of
complaint stating things about the Chinese government and doing
business in China that John Deere thinks are inflamed statements and
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many of the things stated, John Deere believes are not true about
doing business in China (JDP21). (The letter from Agco is cited in
Marsh 2008).
JDCI shared their insight as to the reasons why some companies have
been more successful than others in penetrating the market and growing their
operations in China through M&A and JVs.
The government’s viewpoint of FDI [foreign direct investment]
has changed overtime. When John Deere has created JVs, other FDIs
10 years ago, China really needed FDI. Today they are becoming
more of an equal across the globe and they have tightened the clamps
on who they will allow to invest in China. The U.S. does the same
thing when FDI occurs in industries they believe are critical to national
securities. When China’s CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil
Company) wanted to invest in Chevron, the U.S. believed it was not in
the interest of national security. China’s construction industry is very
protected and nothing higher than a 50/50 JV will currently be allowed
to occur (JDP21).
Agco wanted to have a majority stake or to wholly own CFT,
who is one of the largest tractor producers in China. Therefore China
viewed CFT as a critical SOE. Benye was previously part of CFT and
then became its own SOE and later was sold to a private investor and
finally John Deere purchased Benye from the private investor (JDP21).
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Because of this, government restrictions and scrutiny were less than would
occur if an SOE was being acquired by a foreign company.
JDCI’s legal council provided additional insights about how the
Chinese government views M&As.
Anti-Trust legislation was enacted in August of [2008] and
requires that if a company wishes to do a merger or acquisition they
must file with the government and if there are no challenges to your
proposal within 30 days then it is approved. If the plan is challenged
then it goes through a process of validation. When acquisitions of
state owned enterprises (SOE) occurs, it is a more sensitive issue and
is treated with care ([to ensure that local economical impacts are
favorable.]) If any M&A will place the new company with a majority of
the market share, then it is not allowed (JDLC).
“Sometimes acquisition decisions are black and white but other times
the government beats around the bush and, in a sense, drags things out as in
the example of Agco. The government first gives peripheral reasons and
after 1 and ½ years, the real reason is stated” (JDP21).
Because a JV or M&A can provide a foreign company with many
advantages in the local market including established brand names, Chinese
employees and, to some extent, a dealer network, M&As and JVs have been
the preferred methods for entering the Chinese market by many large MNCs
in the agricultural machinery industry. In 2001, CNH formed a JV with
Shanghai Tractor and Internal Combustion Engine Corporation producing
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low-hp tractors for the Chinese and export markets. This JV formed
Shanghai New Holland Agricultural Machinery Co. Ltd. (Business Editors
2001). Mahindra & Mahindra have also set up a JV with Jiangling Motor Co.
Group. in 2004 forming Mahindra (China) Tractor Co. Ltd. (Hindu
Businessline 2004; Jimtrade 2005).
Establishing any organization requires consideration of legal issues.
JDCI’s experience in China has contributed to the strategies used to expand
in the Chinese market.
John Deere has taken different approaches to setting up
operations. They first started out with technology transfer agreements.
After that, based on the Chinese regulations, they could only do joint
ventures with SOEs. Later they allowed this to occur with other entities
as well. The ideal they would like is 100% John Deere owned
companies unless there is a very strategic decision to make a JV
(JDOM).
Currently, the Chinese government has some basic requirements for
building a new facility.
In setting up a new factory or location in China you must do a
feasibility study that is somewhat like validating your business plan
with the local authorities. This includes your investment plan, products,
scale, estimated capacity, material usage, etc. An environmental
impact study and articles of association are also required (JDLC).
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It was asked of JDCI’s president if there were any business strategy details
that the Chinese government required to become established in the country.
“No. There are details that the government requires to obtain building permits
such as the capacity of the factory and what is intended with the use of the
land, etc…” (JDP21).
As China continues to address its many legal issues and to pass
legislation in accomplishing government goals, businesses need to
understand how China’s dynamic legal system will affect their operations and
the market in which they work. In the agricultural machinery market,
government subsidies are a driving factor. Regulation of how a foreign
company can grow is also very important to consider in successfully meeting
demand for agricultural machinery in China. Establishment of a new factory
or facility is also regulated to an extent. These issues of the Chinese legal
environment are not all that exist in the agricultural machinery industry but
they are some of the main legal challenges and differences of doing business
in China that JDCI have dealt with and learned from.

4.7 Supplier Relations
One of China’s competitive advantages is labor-intensive goods,
because the cost of labor is low compared to developed countries. This is a
primary reason why JDCI has about 90% of their suppliers from China. The
other 10% of suppliers are those who supply the most technically advanced
parts. Manufacturing by any company in China will include the utilization of
Chinese suppliers. These can either be privately controlled or SOEs under
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government control. Both kinds of Chinese suppliers share similarities and
also have unique challenges that they bring to the Chinese agricultural
machinery industry. “The frequency of supplier issues in China is much
higher. One reason is that they are new to the global market and don’t have
the experience of traditional suppliers” (JDSCM). Some of these supplier
issues that JDCI has encountered are discussed.
Because of the growing market in China, there are many companies
competing for the same group of suppliers. When asked about supplier
competition JDCI’s supply chain manager mentioned that “It is fierce.
However there are many opportunities in China. There is more than one
industry competing for the same suppliers.
In China, the view regarding suppliers is that they pick you, not that you pick
them” (JDSCM).
JDCI has focused on their core values in choosing suppliers in China.
John Deere cares, and integrity is one of their core values.
They can’t afford to beat up on suppliers. Compared to other
customers, such as [the] automotive [industry], John Deere’s volume is
low. Therefore, they rely on their core values, respect for the supplier,
and their reputation, and longevity as a company. They also want to
nurture and develop their suppliers and the relationships with them
(JDSCM).
Having to work with available suppliers if they do not meet all desired
requirements of JDCI is more essential in China. This is due to the volume of
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product that JDCI produces compared to other industries such as the
automotive industry that utilize the same suppliers. Suppliers that are
reputable and require little development are not always interested in JDCI
because of their volume. This is a challenge of the Chinese agricultural
machinery industry, not just for JDCI.
JDCI wants to help develop their suppliers to facilitate and protect
JDCI quality while saving both JDCI and the supplier time and money.
“These supplier relationships and the opportunity to build these relationships
are very important. [JDCI] wants these relationships to improve. Therefore
John Deere has invested much into their Chinese suppliers; an ‘army of
resources’” (JDSCM).
Supplier certification is not a single department’s decision. It’s
not always the lowest cost supplier that is used. Quality, engineering,
supplier attitude, and others are all part of the decision to use a
supplier. If the supplier has the attitude of not willing to move forward
and change what the company needs, there is not much that John
Deere can do to help or change that supplier. It blocks John Deeresupplier relationships (JDSCM).
It is a challenge for John Deere and others in China to develop,
train, and change the corporate thinking and culture of suppliers.
Standardized work and Pre-production Approval Process (PPAP) is
used to help suppliers with their production process and then be ready
for mass production. Helping suppliers to realize that if change occurs
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(especially after PPAP) it first needs to be approved by their customer
[(JDCI)] (JDSCM).
Another method that JDCI has implemented in developing their
Chinese suppliers is through incentive programs.
Incentive programs are used but they are not monetary
incentives. John Deere will offer training, management tools,
assessments, recommendations, and other supplier development
methods (lean training, technical professionals, etc…) as an incentive
to suppliers to become better and more efficient. This usually turns out
to be a win-win situation as suppliers save costs, increase efficiency,
consistency, quality, etc. … and John Deere benefits from a more
standardized product or process and less problem solving efforts are
needed (JDSCM).
Remote sourcing in China is a challenge as suppliers often use
this practice. You cannot have this occur because you cannot
guarantee ‘no change’ from the remote sourced supplier products or
processes. You must physically verify supplier products and
processes and use spot checks and ‘no knock’ visits to discover the
unknown and see or prevent problems. You have to quantify the
intangible qualities of a supplier. On the outside or first look, they may
seem to be a well organized and upscale company, but the unknown
parts need to be understood as well (JDSCM).
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These supplier issues are points in the Chinese market that seem to require
additional attention and investment to facilitate smooth operation in the
company.
One good view to have regarding Chinese suppliers is that
seeing is believing. Don’t take what is on paper for granted. Not just
seeing the [product], but how it is made and the supplier process that
is implemented. You need to know China to understand how to do
business in the Chinese environment (JDSCM).
Many local or indigenous suppliers such as Ningbo Benye
(before acquisition) often setup supplier relationships with a one page
contract or through a ‘gentleman’s agreement’. This can be very
unstable with no defined way to handle issues, problems, or guarantee
performance especially if management is changed and the new entities
have to start from scratch in establishing these relationships. John
Deere spells out in black and white, what is expected and if not met,
how it will be dealt with. In this way, regardless of management
changes, the structure is laid out and in place to keep a stable
environment and guarantee John Deere standards (JDSCM).
Advanced Product Quality Planning (APQP), in-house Change
Management Change Process (CMCP), a documented track record,
management of sub-suppliers, project management, and other tools
are things that suppliers must have to minimize risk to the company.
These are sometimes lacking with Chinese suppliers (JDSCM).
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If [the necessary] variables are not present, it doesn’t always
disqualify [the supplier]. All areas are assessed and scored with a
scoring process to determine supplier capability to meet JD needs. In
some cases, as companies are acquired, their suppliers follow and
sometimes these suppliers do not meet John Deere criteria. Therefore
they reassess them, train them, and give them a timeline to close the
gaps which are not acceptable to John Deere (JDSCM).
“Sometimes it is strategically beneficial to use more than one supplier
for supplying the same part to minimize your risk. Because of program
deadlines, if a supplier falls through, emergency sourcing is used to make
sure the program is not delayed” (JDSCM). All of these supplier relation
practices used by JDCI are helping to ensure a reliable supply base to
minimize risk and cost of delays and quality issues to their organization and to
the Chinese customers.
Some problems are larger than others. Sometimes certain
issues such as language barriers, translation issues, and others just
need to be taken note of or allow the company to be aware of. English
capability of employees doesn’t have to be perfect, but needs to be
adequate enough to communicate with your customers and their
concerns (JDSCM).
Part of managing Chinese suppliers is the common situation of gaining
additional suppliers when JVs or M&As occur. Therefore, supplier
consolidation may occur more frequently in Chinese business. “As John
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Deere grows they want to maximize overlap of supplier usage and to help
their suppliers to become bigger and to give them more business” (JDSCM).
JDCI has learned from working with Chinese suppliers and has
adjusted some of their traditional production processes in effectively
implementing changes with Chinese suppliers. One example came from
JDCI’s GT5 transmission manager.
The U.S. engineers do not understand the Chinese supply base
very well. As they implement changes, they may not have in mind
Chinese supplier capabilities. Sometimes [Chinese] suppliers can not
make the product to print, and if they can, sometimes it can only be
done in a very costly way. Once John Deere realized this problem,
they brought the U.S. engineers and Chinese suppliers together to
discuss DPAR (Design Process Assembly Review) to insure the
design part satisfies the functions needed and can be manufactured in
a cost-effective way. It is not cost-effective to keep U.S. engineers in
China for a very long time. Therefore, engineers in China play an
important role in helping this connection as they communicate with U.S.
engineers and can readily visit Chinese suppliers to work together on
these issues (JDTPM).
SOEs are a major factor in the Chinese supplier base. Because of
being government policy driven and not having to guarantee making a profit,
there are additional challenges that occur with these types of suppliers.
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SOEs sometimes will change a direction. They sometimes want
you to do a joint venture with them. As many MNCs come to China,
many suppliers will use attractive pricing to lock in their business and
then afterwards, the unseen issues surface and you are left with a big
problem (JDSCM).
John Deere has learned a very important lesson from the
Chinese suppliers. State-owned enterprises (SOE’s) have a very
underdeveloped management system so when you do business with
those kinds of companies, you have to follow every problem from start
to finish. Sometimes they give you a low price to get your business.
Afterwards, when production starts, they will ask for a price increase
and you may not have as much flexibility in dealing with the situation.
The cost of changing suppliers may be more than the price increase. If
using an SOE for a very critical part of a product, you need to have a
backup supplier planned in advance in case things go wrong, to insure
your product can still be produced on time. Sometimes if an SOE has
problems, John Deere’s alternative suppliers are not interested
because of the volume John Deere uses. Often these alternatives
supply much of the automotive industry, which on-time work is difficult
for SOEs to understand. John Deere has to develop these suppliers
very carefully and they use John Deere employees to validate that
these suppliers did their job correctly (JDTPM).
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Chinese suppliers are not as developed as JDCI’s traditional markets
and as a result, need additional and more frequent attention. Language,
business culture, and many other factors unique to China are important in
Chinese supplier relationships. SOE suppliers can bring additional
challenges in dealing with supplier problems, pricing, timing, and other issues
that are important to being successful in doing business in China. Selecting
and working with reliable suppliers and facilitating their development have
assisted JDCI to meet cost, quality, and timing goals in bringing to market
agricultural machinery.

4.8 Fast and Growing Market
China’s economy has grown at an impressive rate. During the last
decade (1996-2006), gross domestic product (GDP) has almost tripled (see
Figure 3.1). One article produced by Standard Chartered Bank compares
China’s rate of GDP growth to other nations. The annual GDP growth rate in
the United States only takes about 3 months to achieve in China (Green
2007). This likely is a good indication of how the agricultural machinery
market in China is growing as well.
During my visit to JDCI operations in the cities of Beijing and Tianjin
China, multiple construction projects were observed next to virtually every
main road and highway. New orchards and greenhouses were also observed.
Not only is China’s infrastructure changing, but Chinese consumers are being
offered more products and many of these consumers can afford these new
products. Because many companies are racing to capture a part of the
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emerging Chinese market, it has created a very fast-paced business
environment.
During the interviews almost every division of JDCI mentioned the
faster speed of operations, compared to John Deere’s traditional markets,
that is needed to meet demand in China. “China is changing and developing
very quickly. Its government and laws are also quickly changing” (JDLC).
JDCI’s supply chain manger described how JDCI has adjusted to this
Chinese business environment. “John Deere normally would do supplier
auditing once every two years [in their traditional markets]. In China that is
too slow and auditing is done every six months to keep up with the rapid
change that is occurring in the country” (JDSCM).
JDCI’s business strategy in China has also adapted to the fast-growing
agricultural machinery market.
Because John Deere usually takes four to five years to develop
a new product and have it ready for the market, they have decided to
use other entry strategies, such as acquiring Benye, to enter the small
tractor market quickly and in only one year. If they cannot keep up
with the speed of their competitors introducing new product into the
market, they will lose out on market share (JDBDP).
Not only has JDCI used different market entry and growth strategies
because of the rapidly growing market, but these lessons have also been
applied to John Deere’s global operations. For example, JDCI has needed to
bring new products to market at a faster rate than for that at which their
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traditional processes were designed. This has helped them to decrease their
design and production time to capture more of the Chinese market. JDCI’s
director of engineering discussed what JDCI has done to increase the speed
of engineering new products for the Chinese market.
They have not only had to challenge themselves but they have
had to modify some of their global processes to match up the
scheduling of requirement for approving products for the MOA subsidy
list. Because of this they have had to pull work forward to meet their
deadlines. If they didn’t they would lose a whole year (JDE).
Challenging their traditional process has been beneficial for
John Deere because it demonstrates to John Deere how to bring
product to market faster than they previously have. This is especially
critical in growth markets such as China. John Deere’s senior leaders
have realized that this can be helpful in decreasing the time needed to
develop products and this can be used in other markets as well (JDE).
Developing new products in China is utilizing basic designs to meet
specific Chinese agricultural needs. Due to the fast-paced agricultural
machinery market, John Deere is learning how to improve the speed of
product development worldwide. Refining product development processes in
China not only gives John Deere experience in rapid product development but
also helps JDCI’s position with Chinese government officials.
Technology development is advanced technology for China, but
compared with other parts of the world, would not be advanced. It is

99

not rocket science but it is a start. It is nonetheless, Chinese
technology developed by Chinese engineers. This is helpful to John
Deere because this is one of the goals of the Chinese government to
help develop their nation (JDP21).
Part of this growing market is developing products unique to China’s
agricultural processes. “Seeders, tillage equipment, roto-tillers, rice
transplanters and others are being developed especially to help develop
product lines to allow more exclusive dealer arrangements” (JDP21).
As JDCI engineers develop products for this market, it is sometimes
hard to know what the Chinese farmer wants because most farmers in China
have never had agricultural machinery before.
It is much harder to determine the customer requirements for a
tractor or combine in China than in other, more established countries.
Part of the reason is that China is not mechanized (only about 40-45%
mechanized). How do you know what they will value? They don’t
have the experience to know what they want. It is hard to understand
what the customer is thinking and what the product requirements are
and if engineering doesn’t understand that, they are lost (JDE).
This is a challenge and an indication of a growing economy and market.
JDCI manufactures products in China for the local market and for the
export market. A great indicator of the growing Chinese market is the
percentage of product JDCI manufactures for export. “Approximately 3% of
our combine units are exported. These mainly go to Zimbabwe and Russia.
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Approximately 1% of our tractor units are exported. These go to many
countries, with the majority going to Pakistan, Thailand and Mozambique”
(JDOFS). Currently, the vast majority of products are made to fill demand in
the local (Chinese) market. Even though the Chinese economy currently
offers many advantages to exporting finished, Chinese goods, JDCI is
producing to fill the local demand.
As China continues to support and increase agricultural mechanization
of farming, the agricultural machinery market will continue to grow at a rapid
rate. This has caused JDCI to alter their production and development
processes to keep up with the dynamic changes and increases in agricultural
machinery use. Not only has JDCI adapted to market and government
requirements to successfully meet this demand, they have been able to learn
how to increase their global process efficiency and speed to improve John
Deere’s ability to meet demands in other markets.

4.9 Chinese Agricultural Machinery Market
and JDCI’s Marketing
There have been many factors associated with the Chinese agricultural
machinery market that have been previously mentioned. This section focuses
on a more detailed analysis of this market. Current Chinese market practices
and conditions in the agricultural machinery industry and how JDCI has
handled this market are also discussed.
In China, tractors and other forms of agricultural machinery are
relatively new to the Chinese farmer. But the market for tractors in China is
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growing rapidly and the number of firms selling tractors in China is increasing.
One reason for this is the relatively small amount of investment needed to
enter the Chinese market.
Around the world most customers are willing to pay for better
technology in higher hp tractors. That is why John Deere has been the
large hp leader. When you decrease the hp, tractors become
somewhat of a commodity. Everyone can afford to take the risk in
entering the market. That is what Foton did. They previously were in
the auto industry and decided to enter the agricultural market
producing a low performing, nice looking tractor. In four to five years
they became the market leader [in China]. It shows how dynamic the
Chinese market is. Even though their quality was not good in the
beginning, they were successful because the Chinese customer is very
forgiving. If the tractor breaks but they come and fix it for free, the
customer is happy (JDOM).
This illustrates how quickly competitors can become large players in a
growing market.
To compete against these companies, JDCI has continued to offer
higher quality products and to build their reputation in China with the longterm market in mind.
Therefore, the only way John Deere can compete is to offer a lot
of value to the customer. This is why JDCI is gaining more market
share in China. Customers need to understand efficiency and that
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they make more money when their equipment doesn’t break as much.
They are starting to do so like customers in other developed markets
(JDOM).
The agricultural machinery market in China is composed of MNCs and
many local companies, including privately owned corporations and
government SOEs. In Figure 4.10, the market shares for the main
competitors of the Chinese market are illustrated.
Because JDCI acquired Ningbo Benye in August 2007, they are
transitioning the Benye brand to the John Deere brand. This increased their
market share dramatically. When combining JDCI’s and Benye’s tractor
market percentages, JDCI’s total market share is 19%, or the #3 Chinese
tractor market leader.

Intense Competition - no one preeminent
Top three tractor and combine producers account for
55% and 83% market share respectively
Combine Market Share
(Wheel)

Tractor Market Share
SNH
7%
Dongfeng
8%

Other
11%

Other
17%

CFT
23%

John Deere
9%

John Deere
8%
Benye
11%

Zhongshou
(XJ)
13%

Foton Lovol
20%
Yueda
12%

Leadership Communication Forum
Deere & Company

Foton Lovol
61%

25

Figure 4.10. Chinese Agricultural Machinery Market Share Breakdown.
Source: JDCI 2008.
Notes: SNH is CNH’s JV: Shanghai New Holland. CFT is China First Tractor,
an SOE.
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John Deere’s long-term presence in China has given them experience
and time to develop the necessary infrastructure and marketing networks to
do business successfully. More recent MNC additions to the Chinese market
are in the process of developing these business components. “Having a
presence in China is an advantage and their competition is just getting here.
Therefore, they need to establish everything that John Deere is already using
such as a dealer network” (JDP21).
Competition in the Chinese agricultural machinery market has some
unique aspects─SOEs are one of these. Because SOEs are structured by
government officials, they do not always need to make a profit and, even if
inefficiently operated, will not go out of business. This is because of
government backing. This situation causes other local or MNC competitors to
operate at a disadvantage to the SOEs in the Chinese market.
Sometimes it is an even playing field as MNCs compete in the
market (Such as CNH competing against John Deere) but as MNCs
compete against SOEs they are many times at a disadvantage. The
role of the SOEs is to keep people employed, not on returns and this
causes them to not have to worry about inventory and many other
things that MNCs do have to. It is the Chinese government’s rules. An
example: John Deere Apollo 120 tractors were forecasted too low as
demand peaked. China First Tractors (CFT), an SOE, had plenty of
inventory and sold it in the absence of the John Deere tractors in the
market. This was John Deere’s fault in not preparing for the demand
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but CFT had the advantage due to not having to manage inventory as
tightly (JDP21).
If the SOEs run out of money they go get more from the
government; John Deere would go out of business. The SOEs also
use bribes or put products on the market that don’t meet MOA
requirements. These are things that John Deere will not do. Example:
Tractors are certified by model and have a noise requirement. There is
a John Deere tractor which met the requirement with their cab version,
but their open operator station did not. Even though it technically
would be approved on the subsidy list, John Deere took the open
tractor and reengineered it to meet the requirements. This added cost
will not be seen in their returns as Chinese customers don’t care about
the noise requirements (JDP21).
“John Deere’s S-tractor did not meet the noise requirement so they had to
redesign the whole platform to do so. The competition did not meet the
requirement as well, but they were approved anyways” (JDOM). These
examples describe how SOEs are an important part of Chinese market
competition that have certain advantages in gaining market share.
Common market segments in China are comprised of state farms,
large land contractors, and private service contractors. The large majority of
JDCI’s current customers are in the service contractor segment. This makes
sense due to the number of service contractors in China. Most Chinese
farmers do not have large farms and there are a limited number of state farms,
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compared with the number of private Chinese farms. Even though there are
many farmers without agricultural machinery, they are willing to pay a small
fee to service contractors to plow, plant, till, and harvest their small farming
acres. These service contractors are investment payback driven and are very
price sensitive. “Customers are not very loyal. For a tractor, they will change
brands for only 100 RMB” (JDM).
To effectively meet Chinese demand for agricultural machinery, JDCI
has made some adjustments to their marketing processes.
Pricing is [something] they have had to adjust. John Deere
imports products, figure their margin and then give their price to the
dealer to do with what he likes. For locally produced products, they set
the retail price plus freight (varying on location). The dealer takes that
retail price and gets a 2% margin. If they don’t tell the dealer that this
is the minimum price that they will sell the product to the customers,
the dealer sometimes discounts their entire margin to the customer.
Based on their metrics and sales, they give them a year end rebate.
There are very few dealers that will add their own margin on top of
what John Deere gives them (JDM).
Market forecasting in China has been very difficult for JDCI due to the
frequent changes in government policies.
In general, the government efforts and investment in boosting
grain production and building a harmonious society keep the demand
for agricultural machinery high, driving demand towards larger hp
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tractors but it destroys the normal market rhythm and normal
seasonality of sales, making forecast almost impossible (JDCI
President, JDM).
Forecasting methods in China are something that JDCI has needed to
develop. This is discussed in the following section.
Advertising has also been adapted for local conditions. Some of John
Deere’s standard publications have been tailored for China.
John Deere also prints two of their own magazines called
Furrow and Harvest. Furrow is targeted for dealers and government
officials while Harvest is targeted to generate new customers. These
have helpful farming articles and John Deere advertisements. They
also advertise in Agricultural Machinery and other local, provincial, and
national agricultural magazines. This is important because
government officials will view these (JDM).
Government officials have a powerful voice in agricultural policy matters,
especially agricultural machinery subsidy list candidates and requirements.
The most effective forms of advertising include demonstrations and
county fairs where Chinese farmers can see how agricultural machinery
works. As many have never owned machinery, hands-on demonstrations
explain better than words the benefits to the farmers.
JDCI will also work with provincial agricultural bureaus to
sponsor a John Deere Cup which will quiz farmers on their agricultural
knowledge and other agriculturally related competitions. They also
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have John Deere Star in some provinces. This is a ranking they will
give to customers who are using John Deere products and have the
best income in a year; JDCI will give them a tour of a factory and give
them a small gift and some recognition (JDM).
Another reason for advertising through demonstrations is, regardless
of literacy challenges, the farmers will still understand what JDCI’s products
are. One literacy challenge is recognition of the John Deere logo. “It has the
words ‘John Deere’ under the leaping deer, which customers cannot read.
JDCI has looked into creating a logo with Chinese characters instead of the
company’s English name” (JDM). However, most of JDCI’s target market has
adequate literacy rates. “Most of the rural residents who are illiterate would
not be able to afford a John Deere tractor in the first place. Most of their
target market has at least a high school education” (JDM).
Depending on the location in China, certain advertising methods may
be more effective than others.
In central China where there is a more dense population, drive
through road shows, town and village fairs, are all methods used to
demonstrate their products. In Northern China it is colder in winter,
making it harder to do demonstrations before the new farming season.
Therefore, before the weather forecast, they will do some television
advertisements. Radio is not used much (JDM).
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Soft news is another form of local advertising that JDCI uses. “John Deere
employees write articles about their products and then publish it as news”
(JDM).
Internet advertising is only used a little, and this kind of advertising is a
method that JDCI plans to use more frequently.
Only about 5% of John Deere customers use computers, but
this 5% will influence even more customers. As these computer savvy
customers are asked about their opinion regarding agricultural
machinery, they have the opportunity to affect many people. Blogs are
important. If there are negative comments about John Deere products,
they need to quickly handle them. John Deere would like to see and
encourage more positive comments and consumer feedback from their
customers on the Internet. One example of these types of blogs is
www.veryam.com (JDM).
Dealer advertising is a very important part of JDCI’s marketing. “If
there is an initiative that John Deere is trying to push that will not necessarily
bring direct profits to dealers, John Deere will cover 100% of the cost. If there
is a potential that it will increase sales for dealers either short-term or longterm, the dealer covers 50%” (JDM).
The dealerships are the most frequent end-user contact and they can
have a large effect on marketing effectiveness, especially at the local level. A
JDCI dealer in northern Hebei discussed what marketing measures he had
implemented. “Radio, television, newspaper, road signs (tollbooth lights),
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local bus television ads and grass root marketing tools have been used. We
give great service and they were the very first dealer in the area and have a
long history. People have known of [the dealership] for a long time” (TD).
Chinese dealerships are very different from John Deere’s traditional
markets.
It is like a farm and fleet or tractor supply store that carries every
brand and just wants to make a sell. You wouldn’t recognize the
dealership as a John Deere dealer and the only time you would see a
John Deere tractor out front is if they knew you were coming or they
are about to deliver it. The territory manager would be the one doing
the sell job and telling customers why John Deere is better than
competitors. John Deere does have some exclusive dealers but they
are scattered around the country and only about 5% of dealers are
exclusive. JDCI has no owned and operated dealerships [in China]
(JDP21).
To better understand the dealings of a typical Chinese agricultural
machinery dealer, a visit was made to a dealer in northern Hebei. During this
visit it was observed that the dealership sold many different brands of
agricultural machinery, as well as utility trucks and automobiles. They had
several locations for demonstrations and classes about using agricultural
machinery─a different location for different brands. The two main brands of
tractors sold were John Deere and Foton, with 70-80% of the products being
John Deere and the remainder being Foton.
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The demonstrations offered by this dealer have proven to be an
effective marketing tool.
Training is offered twice a year to farmers who would like to
come and participate; they do not [need] to be customers. This offers
them an opportunity to also demonstrate how their products work.
There are about 100 farmers annually who come. This is about 90% of
their customers. The few customers who do not participate are those
who have been using machinery for a while (TD).
When asked about what qualities in tractors that Chinese customers
prefer, the dealer gave feedback ranking the most common to the least
common. “Horsepower, brand and price, cost function, looks (cosmetics),
ease of operation, and after-sale service” (TD). The importance of these
characteristics to the Chinese farmer is crucial in understanding how
companies can better improve their market and meet the demands of
Chinese customers.
Some challenges with Chinese dealers include the different ways that
JDCI’s competition does business with these dealers. This dealer discussed
how JDCI’s quality is superior to other brands but other brands are catching
up. Also, JDCI’s competitors give greater incentives to their dealers than do
JDCI to their dealers.
The net income that a dealer can make from a John Deere
tractor is around 2,000 RMB and the rebate from the same size of
tractor from Foton would be about 4,000 RMB. If John Deere does not
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have good promotion/incentives for their dealers, it is hard to ask the
dealers to fight for more sales of their brand. All of [JDCI’s] incentives
for their dealers combined are still less than other brand incentives.
This occurs throughout China, not just in this province (TD).
John Deere’s advantages of good applications and quality have,
in the past, been way ahead of the competition. Now that gap is
closing as competitors improve their products and services. John
Deere product prices are higher than others and their dealer incentives
are lower than others so some dealers choose to push other brands
more (TD).
In addressing this challenge, JDCI understands that their dealer
management program is more rigorous than their competitors’ programs.
Some competitors will get as many dealers as possible. John
Deere won’t because they want to ensure that within a given area, they
only have one dealer so they will get enough business and volume.
This is how they keep their dealer loyalty. If their dealers sell more
machines they will still receive more income even though their margin
per machine is not as high. John Deere is looking into this challenge
to see how they can rationalize the dealer service fee or warranty labor
rate to help the dealer (JDM).
JDCI also works to develop their dealers.
JDCI has a dealer development function. They have standards
and have recently updated those standards for China. They want to
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help dealers develop to those standards. Last year they awarded the
best dealers who complied with these standards with a service vehicle
to help their business (JDP21).
However, there are many obstacles in developing Chinese dealers.
Because of how government agricultural machinery subsidies are
implemented, some dealers get preferential treatment.
It is difficult to overcome dealer inequalities because the
government promotes some of it. Subsidies drive sales and
sometimes if there is a relationship between someone and a certain
dealer, they will buy John Deere tractors and require that they all be
sold through a specific dealer who may not even be a John Deere
dealer (JDP21).
JDCI currently only has 30% of their dealers who receive all the subsidies for
an area. The rest of the dealers only receive some subsidies.
To continue to improve dealer effectiveness, one tool that JDCI started
using in China in 2007 was dealer auditing.
John Deere has what they call a ‘toolbox’ where dealers fill in
data regarding their sales and dealership, which is then audited by
John Deere. Sales representatives and dealerships work together in
helping to determine their efficiency and performance. If there is
something John Deere would like a dealership to change, it is
communicated. Some dealers require a more strategic approach than
others in encouraging these changes to occur. For example, if a
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dealer carries 10% of John Deere’s business, it requires careful
attention, such as sending top management to negotiate instead of
sales representatives (JDM).
The agricultural machinery market in China is very dynamic with many
idiosyncratic components that businesses must understand to be successful.
There are many competitors who are seeking to grow as the Chinese market
continues to expand. Due to government affairs in the PRC, many MNCs are
placed at a disadvantage to SOEs and other local market players. Market
conditions in China have caused JDCI to adjust some of their marketing
practices, including pricing, advertising, and dealership development.
Chinese agricultural machinery dealers are JDCI’s end-user salesmen, and
they operate very differently from JDCI’s traditional dealers in other markets.
JDCI is moving forward in developing their dealership network despite
dealership inequalities caused by government officials. Through these
measures, JDCI is continuing to improve their marketing division to know how
to better meet demand for agricultural machinery in China.

4.10 Order Fulfillment Process
JDCI’s order fulfillment process is an important part of successfully
meeting market demand. In delivering products to the customer, many
resources and factors need to be considered to effectively satisfy customers,
reduce costs, and realize market opportunities. The unique features of the
Chinese market that affect this portion of the business are discussed. JDCI’s
current order fulfillment process in China, its challenges, and successes are
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also discussed. An overview of the current John Deere order fulfillment
process, as it functions in their mature markets outside of China, is given as
background information to aid in the understanding and comparison of JDCI’s
current process in China. The order fulfillment specialist at JDCI helped in
providing this information.
It all starts with forecasting of their complete goods sales. They
look at an annual number as well as the current month plus the next
three months to focus on production planning. This forecast process
has three inputs to their composite forecast process: (1) factory input,
(2) marketing organization, and (3) statistical component. Factory
input is the demand the factory sees, the marketing organization gets
feedback from their branches to contribute a demand estimate, and the
statistical component is calculated from their forecasting group in
Moline, IL. These three factors are weighted based on their prior
accuracy, and result in a composite forecast for retail sales (JDOFS).
This allows them to do ‘days-on-hand’ planning and set-up
inventory turn goals by product family. An example is combines, which
are very expensive, and most customers have a well thought out plan
when purchasing and don’t expect dealers to have them on hand.
Therefore, this product has very high inventory turn-rate. It turns very
quickly. Tractors, on the other hand, are not as expensive, and if
customers don’t see what they are looking for on hand, they will buy
the competitor’s brand. This therefore has very slow inventory turn-
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rate because customers’ purchasing behavior is more of an impulse
buy than a well-planned purchase (JDOFS).
Once John Deere knows the inventory turn rate for a product
and the forecasted demand, they can plan how many days on hand
they need to insure enough inventory in the field to meet the forecast.
They then do a lot of work within the factory to give the dealer an
“availability to promise” (ATP) delivery date. The dealer will enter an
order on their computer system. Then John Deere’s system will look at
the production schedule and within one second, give back an ATP date.
There is not much cushion built into this date because they do not want
to be holding inventory for too long. This allows them to better manage
their assets and produce only what is needed (JDOFS).
The current situation in China is much different than John Deere’s
traditional markets.
They don’t collect or have much of the retail sales data. They
know when they’ve shipped it to a dealer and have been paid, but they
do not know what date that product was delivered to a third party.
They are working with their warranty and customer support group in
China to help develop these systems to identify delivery dates, to start
tracking warranties, and to allow dealers to input retail information
online. This is a multi-step process, as many dealers do not currently
use computers; many of their orders still come in by fax (JDOFS).
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In the mean time, they are using a composite forecast that is
based on shipments, not retail sales, until they are able to start
tracking this data. They will need at least two years before they can
statistically calculate a forecast number. Previously, the marketing
group just gave a factory number, and they were very conservative in
their estimate. Therefore, throughout the year, their forecast continues
to increase and this does not give production adequate time to plan.
Now they have the factory input and a marketing division number by
product family, and they also have strategic marketing give a number.
The field marketing number, as expected, is always the lowest
(JDOFS).
With this new system they are now starting to implement, their
composite forecast for China is higher than what marketing previously
had given. They will start measuring accuracy in November 2008, look
at three months, and start to weight their forecast numbers based on
this accuracy. As they are changing marketing to this new process, it
has been challenging to help [marketing] understand why the new
forecast is higher than what they feel they can sell. They now have a
lot more data compared to feelings and thoughts previously. [JDCI has]
been able to bring a lot more accuracy to these numbers as well
(JDOFS).
[JDCI is] also bringing their factories online with the SAP system
and John Deere’s complete goods system that is operating worldwide.
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This will allow other factories around the globe to order John Deere
China tractors. The ATP system is also in the plans for the future.
Currently it takes three days for a dealer to get a delivery date,
because John Deere has to manually prioritize and evaluate their
production system (JDOFS).
Part of the order fulfillment process is placing the order. Currently,
because JDCI has grown through JVs and M&A, if a dealership wants a
combine and a tractor, they need to place orders with two separate factories.
JDCI plans to consolidate this process to increase its efficiency and simplicity.
This will be done by establishing a central sales organization based in JDCI’s
Beijing office.
As JDCI has developed their order fulfillment process in the Chinese
market, they have taught their Chinese network how to accurately measure
success in meeting market demand. Previously, where rough estimates and
conservative forecasts were made, they are now using metrics to aid in
accuracy of production and delivery scheduling. Instead of operating on an
“under-promise over-deliver” method, they want to hold less inventory but still
not miss out on market opportunities. JDCI is moving towards these goals as
they learn how to adapt to Chinese market conditions. As they do so, both
service to Chinese farmers and JDCI’s operations will improve.

4.11 Conclusion
The demand for agricultural machinery in China is continuing to
increase. If historical trends continue, the rate of increase in demand will also
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continue to grow. Corresponding trends can be seen in the analysis of
Chinese state farms. As the Chinese government continues to support
agricultural machinery development and use in agriculture, it will continue to
shape an important part of the agricultural machinery market in China.
The Chinese agricultural machinery market is a rapidly changing and
dynamic environment that has been greatly affected by China’s centrally
controlled government. IPR, government relations, legal environment, SOEs
all are tied to the Chinese government. As China has become more open to
international trade, markets, and business, governmental role in planning
economic affairs has lessened. However, as businesses have adjusted to the
unique circumstances in China, Chinese government policies and practices
are important factors to consider.
Through the case study of JDCI, many specific business methods and
practices used in meeting the challenges and dynamics of the Chinese
agricultural machinery market have aided in answering how to successfully
meet this demand. Even though there are details and circumstances specific
to JDCI’s operations, these challenges bring enhanced experience in
operating within the Chinese agricultural machinery market. These specific
issues have broader lessons of application as key components of the
business are handled in ways unique to China. Through these experiences,
the question is answered about how a business successfully meets
agricultural machinery demand in China.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Introduction
In endeavoring to define the demand for agricultural machinery in
China and how demand is currently being met, there are a number of points
that have implications for MNCs that want to do business in China. This
research has provided some additional understanding about the Chinese
agricultural machinery market. The results of the research can have practical
application for any company in the agricultural machinery industry and also
many companies related to Chinese agriculture in general.

5.2 Implications
The demand for agricultural machinery in China is growing. Much of
this growth is being driven by the Chinese government and its desire to
increase rural incomes and agricultural efficiency. Other reasons are that the
Chinese government desires these changes as a method to increase political
stability and national food security. Not only is the growth in machinery
demand in China largely influenced by the government but the Chinese
government also plays a very important role in the market through SOEs.
There are many peripheral issues about the agricultural machinery
market in China such as IPR, legal environment, and supplier relations
specifics that will continue to evolve. The findings of this research
demonstrate the rapid change occurring in each of these areas as well as the
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features unique to the Chinese market. Therefore, any business wanting to
expand into the Chinese agricultural machinery market must carefully
consider the dynamics of these issues. Companies can also learn how to
better adapt to these issues in China by understanding how JDCI has dealt
with them. For example, as companies become actively involved in shaping
government understanding of an industry, the results can be very beneficial to
doing business in China and to the Chinese people. This was seen in the
example of JDCI actively dealing with government officials on the local level
in Jiamusi, China.
The composition of the Chinese agricultural machinery market is
changing as companies grow through JVs and M&A. This can be seen in
JDCI’s example of business expansion in China. Market players are racing to
meet the demands of the Chinese farmers as the market continues to expand.
This information can contribute to a company’s understanding of the size and
scope of this industry. Businesses need to consider the outlook and
composition of the market to know how to better meet demand not yet
adequately filled by current market players.
The facts and research presented in this dissertation can help
investors know if the agricultural machinery market in China is potentially a
good investment and how to manage the implementation of such an
investment. It is a fast and growing market but the speed of change can also
be a risk to consider. This market is growing very quickly with a large part of
the growth attributed to government incentives to Chinese farmers. However,
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if government priorities change, this market could quickly decelerate. From
the results obtained, growth is occurring and will likely continue into the
foreseeable future. Therefore, with government policies increasing their
support of agricultural each year, the Chinese agricultural machinery industry
would likely be a profitable market to invest in.
This research also has implications for Chinese agricultural machinery
dealers because the research will provide them with a broader picture of what
is occurring throughout China; thus, they may be more inclined to alter their
investment strategies within this market.
Even though this research focuses on the Chinese agricultural
machinery market, many of the challenges of meeting market demands that
have been identified will be similar to those found in other centrally controlled
countries. However, future research must be done in these economies to
determine the relevance of the findings of this dissertation in agricultural
machinery markets of other nations.

5.3 Future Research
Because of the time and resource limitations to this research, only one
MNC was studied. A multiple-case study of several MNCs in the Chinese
agricultural machinery industry would bring additional insight into how
businesses have successfully met Chinese agricultural machinery demand. If
multiple MNCs have dealt with the same challenges in the Chinese market
that this research has identified, then increased validity and generalizability
would result.
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Gathering large amounts of primary data by surveying Chinese farmers
and their reasons for purchasing agricultural machinery and their general
situation in the agricultural industry would have been helpful additions to the
research of this topic. These data could have been analyzed to discover the
weight of each factor in the average Chinese farmer’s decision to purchase
agricultural machinery. Since climate, policies, and the agricultural industry
vary by location, these surveys could be done in multiple provinces to obtain
an even more accurate observation of the Chinese agricultural machinery
market.
In terms of meeting demands of the Chinese market, different
agricultural industries could be compared to determine commonalities across
these industries. This would result in differentiating issues specific to each
industry and issues common to the Chinese agricultural sector.
This dissertation is also a good base for developing an econometric
model that defines and estimates Chinese agricultural machinery demand. If
increased amounts of reliable data were generated through additional
research, an econometric approach would be a valid way of addressing these
inquiries.

5.4 Practice
As JDCI continues to be a key player in striving to shape the
machinery industry through its government relations, it will be important to
continue to understand the economic factors of the Chinese agricultural
machinery market and Chinese agriculture in general. This dissertation
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discusses the main issues of this market and may be of some benefit to
JDCI’s understanding of these factors. The case study analysis of JDCI’s
operations also brings a good overview of the organization that may be useful
for JDCI’s future use and development of market solutions in China.
This research has practical application for many organizations wanting
to study or understand the workings of agriculture machinery in China. It
provides adequate resources, references, and findings that can be used to
develop policies and business strategies pertaining to this market. The
usefulness of this research is especially realized as businesses can
understand how to be better prepared to enter an emerging market,
especially the agricultural machinery market in China.
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CHAPTER 6
SELF-REFLECTION

The experience of writing a dissertation has been a very educational,
rewarding, time-consuming, and frustrating one. Along the way, I’ve gained a
better understanding of available research methodologies, methods, and
writing formats. There are many other things I have learned that cannot all be
quantified or described. Some of the successes of this research and
improvements that would be implemented in future research will be discussed.
My particular topic being researched is defining and meeting the
demand for agricultural machinery in China. This research has allowed me to
understand peripheral and specific issues of this topic. Even though there
has previously been little research on this topic, I have been able to find
insight and learn from the work of others. This research has taken me across
the globe and has broadened my understanding of the Chinese agricultural
machinery market and how current businesses are dealing with the
challenges of this emerging global market.
I believe that meeting with a world-renowned MNC to complete this
case study research has been a great success, and I am very grateful to
many individuals who made this possible. Because of the scope and
experience that this MNC has brought to the case study, very practical and
real-life results have been obtained. Also, to go and visually see what is
occurring in the agricultural machinery market in China was a great
experience.
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Challenges of this dissertation include access to accurate data and
information regarding the Chinese market. Because China is an emerging
market, access to reliable information has been more difficult compared to
other locations. Also, compiling the results of the case study into a concise
summary and analysis has been difficult. As much insight from John Deere
has been shared, there is a great desire to utilize all the information obtained.
However, in keeping the research focused, only data relevant to the research
question were used.
If this research were to be completed again, I believe it would be
helpful to include some more in-depth detail on additional issues that
contribute to the agricultural machinery market in China, such as the hukou
system. Even though adequate data for an econometric analysis is lacking, I
would like to use the available data to analyze agricultural machinery demand
and see if the results were supportive of the findings of this dissertation.
Overall, this dissertation has been very rewarding in helping me to
understand more of an area that has always been a question I have wanted
to look into. The information and insights gained from the completion of this
dissertation will contribute in helping others understand this topic. Hopefully,
through additional research, the agricultural machinery industry in China will
be better understood by future generations.
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Appendix A: Summary of Land Tenure
Development in China

Private land markets: pre-1949. Under China’s feudal system, land was
held by small landowners who farmed their own land, and by landlords who
rented land to tenant farmers. Land markets were supported by (often local)
institutions to define boundaries, register ownership, and provide titles.
Land reform: 1950-53. China's new government implemented a national
land reform movement soon after coming to power in 1949. Landholdings
were redistributed to landless and land-short farm households. Deeds held by
landlords were destroyed, and new deeds were issued to the new owners
along with full rights to rent and sell their land.
Initial collectivization: 1953-57. Shortly after land reform, Party cadres
began encouraging farmers to set up agricultural producer cooperatives—
small groups of farm households that pooled some or all of their land and
farmed the larger plots collectively. Income was distributed according to the
land each household contributed to collective production. After forming
cooperatives, the cooperatives were pooled into larger collectives where
income was distributed according to the amount of land and labor contributed.
By 1957, over 90% of farm households had organized into roughly 700,000
large agricultural collectives.
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Full collectivization: 1958-78. Under the Great Leap Forward, agricultural
collectives were ultimately merged into 24,000 communes encompassing
entire townships.
Households turned over nearly all of their productive assets, and
teams of workers carried out nearly all production (households often
maintained small private plots during all or part of the collective period).
Income was distributed according to labor contribution and need through a
complex system of “workpoints." This system existed through the end of the
Cultural Revolution (1966-76), except for a period of partial liberalization in
the early 1960s.
Decollectivization: 1978-84. Under new leadership, China's government
encouraged efforts to alleviate poverty and induce economic growth. Many
rural areas abandoned collective production entirely and contracted with
households to deliver fixed amounts of grain in exchange for access to land.
Households were allowed to keep the remaining production for their own
consumption or to sell on the market.
Household Responsibility System: 1984-present. In 1984, the expanding
system of contracting with households directly was officially approved by
China's national government. The law stipulated that land was still owned by
the collective, but did not clarify whether the collective was the village or the
xiaozu. The law also stipulated that households should receive 15-year
contracts to their land, and have the right to rent land and hire labor.
Collectives maintained the right to reallocate land among households.
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Subsequent clarifications and directives have encouraged extending the
contract length from 15 to 30 years, providing households with written
contracts, and limiting the collective's right to reallocate land.
30-Year Use-Right Policy: Beginning in 1993, China adopted a policy (but
not a legal requirement) that farmers should have 30-year use rights─one
generation rights─on their land. RDI’s research has shown that 30 years is a
sufficient time horizon to permit farmers to make virtually all forms of longterm investment in the land. This has been confirmed by fieldwork in regions
of China (such as Fuyang Municipality of Anhui Province, and in Guizhou
Province) where farmers in fact received secure 30-year rights shortly after
the new policy was announced.
Land Management Law (LML): Then in 1998, the 30-year use rights policy
was adopted as a legal requirement in a new Land Management Law (LML),
with such rights to be embodied in formal written contracts. Subsequently,
RDI carried out, in cooperation with Renmin University (Beijing Peoples’
University), two major sample surveys—in 1999 (.pdf) and 2001 (.pdf)—on
the implementation of these provisions. Each of these surveys covered over
1600 households in 17 Chinese provinces, with a probable margin of error of
± 2.4%. The survey results showed that, by mid-2001, 47% of farm
households had received 30-year contacts, and 40% of farm households had
high confidence that they would be on the same land for the full 30 years. The
latter result projects out to 85 million farm households who now have
confidence in their security of tenure.
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Central Committee Document No. 18: In December of 2001, RDI’s village
research findings prompted officials to issue this policy directive reiterating
farmers’ right to voluntarily transfer their land rights while condemning, in very
specific terms, any actions by local officials to interfere with farmers’ rights
through attempted “re-contracting” (taking farmers' land and re-contracting it
to investors or corporations without voluntary action by or even compensation
to the original right-holders) and similar practices. This pronouncement
signaled key policy-makers’ support for strengthening and protecting farmers’
rights in anticipation of new legislation.
Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL): In August of 2002, the Standing
Committee of the National Peoples’ Committee adopted this groundbreaking
law, replacing the single article of the LML that had dealt with farmers’ landtenure rights with a detailed spelling out of farmers’ land rights and remedies.
The RLCL offers substantial additional assurance of farmers’ 30-year rights,
narrowing any possible remaining grounds for readjustments, detailing what is
to be in the written contract, incorporating in formal law the protections for
farmers’ land rights contained in Central Committee Document No. 18, and
setting forth a comprehensive range of remedies for farmers whose land
rights are violated.
The RLCL spells out, for the first time, farmers’ rights to carry out
transactions with their land rights, including not only lease, but assignment of
the full 30-year right. Estimates of the probable market value of these rights in
farmers’ hands, once a market has developed, range from around $400 billion
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up to $1 trillion. This represents new wealth for farmers in place of what had
been (using Hernando de Soto’s phrase) “dead capital”.
Sources: Lohmar, Somwaru, and Wiebe 2002; Rural Development Institute
2007.
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Appendix B: Summary of China’s WTO
Agricultural Commitments

Source: Crook (2002 : 14).
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Appendix C: Summary of Rural Credit
Sources in China

Individual Savings and Informal Borrowing. Most farm investments and
input purchases in rural China are financed by farmers’ own savings. Most
loans to rural households come from informal sources: family, friends, private
money lenders, savings clubs, and pawnbrokers (Wang; Guo and He).
Informal lending is not legal but it is widely tolerated in many areas.
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs). Most formal loans to farm households
are made by more than 30,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). RCCs
accept deposits from local residents and make loans to households,
businesses, and other entities. RCCs were set up in agricultural communes in
the late 1950s by requiring each farmer to make a small cash contribution.
After collective agriculture was disbanded in the 1980s, RCCs continued as
the rural arm of the state banking system with an RCC serving each of
China’s 40,000 townships. Reforms in 2003 and 2004 placed them under
provincial governments and merged them into county- or provincial-level RCC
unions (Xie). RCCs can only operate in their home township or county. Some
of the stronger RCCs are being restructured as provincial rural commercial
banks or cooperative banks, and some of those have recently attracted
foreign investors. RCCs are cooperatives in name only. Their ownership is
unclear and members do not necessarily have any say in management.
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). Loans to agricultural enterprises come
largely from the ABC, one of China’s four state-owned commercial banks. It
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was created in the late 1970s to carry out rural policy, but became a
commercial Bank serving both urban and rural markets after reforms in 1994.
The ABC lends to agricultural enterprises, rural cooperatives, and village
organizations, but not usually to individual rural households.
Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC). Commodity
procurement is supported by loans from the ADBC, formed in 1994 to relieve
the ABC of its policy functions. The ADBC primarily lends to state-owned
enterprises for procurement and storage of grain, cotton, and edible oils. The
ADBC’s role is diminishing as the government privatizes agricultural
commodity marketing.
The ADBC also makes loans for agribusiness and rural infrastructure.
Recent Reforms. Since the late 1990s, the government has taken numerous
steps to reform and commercialize its banking system, but it was not until
2003 that it began a major reform of rural credit cooperatives. The ABC, like
China’s other state-owned banks, is being transformed into a profit-seeking
commercial bank with the ultimate goal of being listed on overseas stock
exchanges. The creation in 2003 of a bank regulator, the China Bank
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), was an important reform of the financial
sector. In recent years, RCCs in several provinces have been reorganized as
rural commercial or cooperative banks and most other RCCs have been
merged into county- or provincial-level unions. They have been given more
latitude to offer higher interest rates on deposits (to compete with post offices
and banks) and adjust interest rates on loans within a band around rates set
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by the People’s Bank of China. Credit reporting services have just begun
operating, but evaluation of loan applications is problematic due to
falsification or absence of financial records (many transactions are still
conducted in cash), unfamiliarity with risk analysis, and latent cronyism.
Source: Gale and Collender (2006 : 6).
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Appendix D: Initial Questions to John Deere

Information for John Deere (China) Case Study

Dear President,
Again thank you for your help and time on this matter. The information
sought for in compiling this case study is as follows:
1. General history and background of John Deere being established in
China.
2. General rationale for wanting to expand into China.
3. Challenges & obstacles (i.e. political, cultural, logistical) in starting
Chinese operations, production, and retail.
4. How has John Deere (in general) overcome these challenges?
5. What provinces does John Deere reach with its current operations?
6. Does John Deere offer any financing options to its Chinese customers?
7. How does John Deere plan to make tractors available to more farmers
in China?
8. Why the use of joint-ventures such as Tiantuo/ Ningbo Benye?
9. How do John Deere tractors compare to local brands in China in terms
of quality/demand/availability to customers and especially rural farmers?
10. How successful were John Deere tractors in China as it progressed?
11. What tractor market share in China does John Deere have especially
compared to local brands?
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12. What percentage of tractors sold in China is 20-50hp, 50-100 hp,
100hp+?
13. Does John Deere import any tractors to sell in China?
14. What does John Deere feel the typical Chinese farmer needs to be
more productive?
15. Are any NGOs helping further John Deere tractors in China?
16. How have current Chinese agricultural policies affected John Deere
tractors in China?
17. Who are your principal competitors in China?
These are the basic questions that I believe will help us form the basis for this
case study.
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Appendix E: Initial John Deere Interview Questions
John Deere 戶翰迪戶
Interview questions

With your approval, I would like to accomplish about 10-20 one-hour
interviews (shorter if need be) with key players of the case study (depending
on their schedules and availability).

Around 8-10 questions. These

individuals include:
•

President of JDCI

1. How do you think the Chinese government has responded to John
Deere's acquisition of Ningbo Benye Tractors? Why do you say that?
How do you believe future responses will unfold? Difference in Agco’s
and other international competitor’s recent approaches to Joint
Venture’s/acquisitions/entry into Chinese market? (maybe mention
Agco’s recent failure to do so with First Tractor)
2. Do you believe other international competitors have/will be able to
easily follow suit? (CNH, Mahindra) Why or why not? What other
barriers to John Deere’s competition exist in China? Do these barriers
make it easier or more difficult for JD to develop its markets in China?
What do you think John Deere’s competitive advantages are? (Quality,
Brand name?? How are these advantages (brand name, quality)
recognized by customers and competitors in China?)
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3. How have you managed Patent and Intellectual Property Rights in your
China operations? (understand legislation is in place, but enforcement
is lacking)
4. What barriers exist to farm sizes increasing in China? Your outlook on
this? Rate of increase? Other barriers to increasing farm incomes?
5. How do you see your product mix in China developing over time? (HP
options, specialized equipment, increased accessory options?) Why?
6. What challenges/restrictions does the PRC place on John Deere
regarding repatriation of profits? Summary of current process?
7. How does the Chinese government see its role regarding competition?
(Is it a neutral observer, does it promote competition, or does it
encourage a more cooperative approach?) How is competition in
China different than in other markets?
8. What agencies, officials have you needed to consider/communicate
with in moving John Deere forward in China?
9. How often is communication with government officials necessary to
allow John Deere to function effectively in China?
10. What information concerning strategy, operations, business dealings
does the government require you to disclose? How often?
11. What is your dealer relationship structure? What is John Deere’s
owned and operated dealership mix in China?
12. How does John Deere develop/manage dealerships? Overcome dealer
inequalities?
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•

Marketing Director

1. What has John Deere done to increase demand of their products in
China? (may be too general)
2. What restrictions exist relating to advertising and other types of
promotions in China?
3. What methods of advertising and promotion are used in China? Does
this vary in each province?
4. Have you recruited any indigenous liaisons to better introduction John
Deere products to rural Chinese customers?
5. How are American/Foreign products viewed to the average Chinese
consumer? Are they more loyal to native brands?
6. What marketing adjustments have you needed to make in the Chinese
market compared to other global locations especially
7. How have you overcome illiteracy challenges in marketing? Any other
challenges with Chinese marketing?
8. What is the dealer/HQ relationship regarding marketing
campaigns(implementations)? What is the marketing cost structure
between dealerships/HQ?
9. Are there any government restrictions on marketing
initiatives/investments? If so, how are these managed?
10. What other considerations relating to marketing do you believe would
be important to consider?
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•

Supply Chain Manager

1. Please tell me about supplier competition. What role do other
local/international tractor manufacturers play?
2. What Supply Chain Management challenges has John Deere faced in
China?
3. Is there a specific example that you could share regarding how a
Chinese supplier challenges surprised JD in any way?
4. Have there been many quality concerns when working with local
suppliers? What main concerns have there been?
5. Have you been able to use supplier auditing or incentive programs,
ranking systems to guarantee JD quality standards? What other ways
are supplier quality standards managed/guaranteed?
6. Has John Deere sought any integration with suppliers in China to more
easily provide reduced costs to their operations in China? Why or why
not? If so, in what ways have they done so?
7. Are Chinese suppliers used to supply other global operations? Why or
why not? What challenges or advantages are seen in this approach?
8. How are Chinese suppliers in terms of lag times, efficiency, inventory
controls? How is this managed?
9. What percentage of your suppliers is local? What inputs are they
providing? Commodities, products, services?
10. What other supply chain issues should be considered?
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•

One or Two John Deere Dealerships

1. What qualities in tractors do most of your John Deere customers want?
Inquire about?
2. Are most customers knowledgeable about government farm machinery
subsidies and has it been a challenge to effectively implement?
3. Do you offer training in machinery operation to customers? If so, to
what extent is it utilized?
4. How have you implemented local marketing strategies? How
successful do you believe they have been? What changes in local
marketing and promotional strategies would you suggest?
5. Do you sell only John Deere or competitor products as well?
6. How are repairs and servicing for JD products handled?
7. Do you rent machinery? Do any service contracting?
8. What, if any, changes would you like to see in JD’s strategy that might
improve the local market for their equipment?
9. Any other information regarding John Deere, machinery in general, do
you believe is important?
•

If possible, one or two John Deere customers from each of the three
main market segments included in the slideshow information.
o

Large State Farm

1. How often do you purchase new farm machinery?
2. What was your most recent JD purchase?
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3. Do you believe John Deere provides adequate support to your
John Deere products? Information about the product, service,
etc.?
4. What have you liked about John Deere machinery?
5. What more would you like to see from John Deere?
6. How long have you used John Deere machinery?
7. How do you feel it has benefited your operations and its
efficiency?
8. Any other information regarding John Deere, machinery in
general, do you believe is important?
o

Large Contractor

8. Why did you buy John Deere equipment? What equipment did
you purchase?
9. To you, what is the most important reason that you wanted to
use agricultural machinery?
10. Why not hire more labor instead?
11. How long have you used John Deere machinery?
12. How do you believe it has benefited your operations and its
efficiency?
13. Do you believe other farmers would like to implement machinery
in their operations? Would you encourage them to do so? Why
or why not?
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14. Any other information regarding John Deere, machinery in
general, do you believe is important?
o

Service Contractor

1. How many farmers/mu per year do you contract to work? Do
you personally own?
2. Why did you buy John Deere equipment? What equipment did
you purchase from John Deere?
3. Do you believe you can grow your business as a result of
purchasing agricultural equipment? Why or why not?
4. How often do you purchase new machinery?
5. How are fuel costs affecting your business? How has this
affected your desire/ability to purchase more farm equipment?
6. What else is helping or hurting your business?
7. What uses besides agriculture, if any, do you use your
equipment for? (construction, hired to move things, etc?)
8. What do you like/dislike about John Deere machinery?
9. Any other information regarding John Deere, machinery in
general, do you believe is important?
•

Any key managers that you feel would be appropriate (Employee
Supervisors?)

1. What have you liked about working at John Deere?
2. What are John Deere’s main employee incentive programs? (奬勵
jiang3 li4)
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3. What kinds, if any, of educational opportunities or reimbursement
programs do you support or offer? How does John Deere view this
issue regarding its Chinese workforce?
4. What Chinese/English learning programs, if any, do you support or
offer to employees?
5. How have you managed language challenges and bilingual operations
in China?
6. What other employee/workforce issue do you believe are important to
consider in China?
•

Any others, as the study progresses, that would be available and
beneficial to adding insight into the case.
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